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ABSTRACT 
 
THE AKP’S DELIRIOUS SPACES: ENJOYING THE NOTIONS OF 
CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECTURE IN NEOLIBERAL TURKEY 
 
Doruk Tatar 
Cultural Studies, MA, 2012 
Thesis Advisor: Sibel Irzık 
 
 After the Justice and Development Party (AKP), that had been in office for almost ten 
years, presented the project of Kanal Istanbul, more commonly known as the ‘crazy project’ 
in the eve of 2011 general elections, a state of excess and delirium became visible in several 
segments of society such as mass media and business sector. With respect to its vision of 
changing the landscape in quite a radical fashion, the ‘crazy project’ is emblematic of the 
excessive and delirious state in the construction sector for the last five years or so in Turkey. 
This thesis focuses on the AKP’s hegemony through its spatial practices and regulations of 
everyday life. In this research, the role of social fantasy is discussed regarding the ways in 
which the notions of architecture and construction are conceived. Accordingly, the issue of 
‘catching up with the West’, which has been quite prevalent from the foundation of the 
republic, is re-problematized in the neoliberal context. Apart from the discursive aspect of the 
subject, the role of enjoyment (jouissance), that which escapes analysis, is taken into 
consideration by consulting Lacanian psychoanalysis and its pertinent concepts throughout 
this thesis.      
 
 
Keywords: The Justice and Development Party (AKP), architecture, construction, space, 
hegemony, psychoanalysis, enjoyment, transgression, Turkey 
 
3 
 
 
ÖZET 
AKP’NİN ÇILGIN MEKANLARI: NEOLİBERAL TÜRKİYE’DE İNŞAAT VE 
MİMARI KAVRAMLARINDAN HAZLANMA 
Doruk Tatar 
Kültürel Çalışmalar MA, 2012 
Tez Danışmanı: Sibel Irzık 
 
 2011 genel seçimleri öncesinde, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin (AKP) Kanal İstanbul 
projesini – veya daha çok bilinen adıyla ‘çılgın projeyi’ – kamuoyuna duyurmasının 
ardından, toplumun birçok kesiminde taşkın bir ruh hali kendini gösterdi. Fiziksel coğrafyayı 
radikal bir şekilde değiştirme tahayyülüne istinaden, ‘çılgın proje’ son birkaç yıldır 
Türkiye’de inşaat sektörünün içinde bulunduğu taşkınlık halini temsil edici niteliktedir. Bu 
tez, AKP hegemonyasının mekansal ve günlük hayatı düzenliyici pratikler üzerinden nasıl 
kurulduğuna odaklanıyor. Bu araştırma dahilinde, toplumsal fantazinin rolü mimari ve inşaat 
kavramlarının algınalışı üzerinden tartışılıyor. Yine bu doğrultuda, cumhuriyetin 
kuruluşundan itibaren güncelliğini koruyan “Batı’yı yakalama” olgusu neoliberal bir 
arkaplanda yeniden sorunsallaşırılıyor. Konunun söylemsel boyutunun yanısıra, hazzın 
(jouissance) rolü Lacancı psikanaliz ve ilgili kavramlar doğrultusunda tez boyunca 
irdeleniyor.  
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), mimari, inşaat, mekan, 
hegemonya, psikanaliz, haz, ihlal, Türkiye 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
During the electoral campaigns in 2011, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Prime Minister of Turkey 
and the president of the ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, 
announced Kanal Istanbul – better known as the ‘crazy project’ – after weeks of suspense 
about the content of the party’s ‘mysterious’ and ‘crazy project’.  In broad strokes, the project 
entailed opening up a man-made strait, a new Bosporus so to speak, in addition to the already 
existing natural one to be finished by 2023, the hundredth anniversary of the foundation of 
the Turkish Republic. Erdoğan states that the main objective of the project was to canalize the 
heavy oil tanker traffic in the Bosporus to the new canal. By this way, he claimed, the danger 
derived from oil tankers could be eliminated, and the Bosporus would again be a “natural 
wonder” in which “history and the future co-exist.” Kanal Istanbul, however, does not merely 
consist of a 50 kilometer long, 25 meter deep and 150 meters wide canal connecting the Sea 
of Marmara to the Black Sea; it also includes a comprehensive urbanization and ‘mall-
ization’ around the canal. In a way, what the masterminds of this project have in their minds 
is building up a second city within the provincial borders of Istanbul and restructuring the – 
now-going-to-be island – Istanbul metropolitan area. Moreover, it is not hard to guess that 
this kind of far-reaching urban project summons question marks concerning the necessity of 
infrastructure. Overall, the project is estimated to cost more than 6 billion dollars. Besides the 
need for huge financial resources, there are several other possible problems that this project 
will cause: environmental issues, the uncertainty of what to do with the settlements over the 
construction area, and the status of the new Bosporus in terms of international law, to name 
but a few.  
Besides the content of the project, its presentation deserves specific attention by virtue 
of its style, scale, and organization. Weeks before the mega-event of the project’s 
presentation, the party made a preannouncement without giving any information about the 
content. This gesture – which can be read as a ‘marketing success’ – added some mystery into 
the phenomenon of the ‘crazy project’. The content of the project became a subject in 
everyday conversations as people tried to guess the content. Eventually, the presentation of 
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the project did some justice to the curiosity not only in terms of its content but also regarding 
the ‘form’ of the whole event. The presentation by the Prime Minister himself turned into a 
political spectacle par excellence regarding several factors such as the organization of the 
space of the congress center, the meticulous selection of the audience, the use of digital 
animation, and the extensive coverage of the event in a hyperbolic and lofty fashion by the 
mainstream media.  
At the outset of the TV broadcast, we see an excited crowd cheering Erdoğan by 
calling him ‘grand master’. The first few minutes of his speech were frequently interrupted 
by applauses and outcries of individuals ‘oiling’ Erdoğan which further ignited the crowd. 
Nonetheless, the delirious state of the crowd did not last long against the (over-) confident 
and charismatic performance staged by Erdoğan. After the crowd settled down, the Prime 
Minister started his speech which was decorated with poems and saturated with allusions to 
the ‘ancestors’. It was quite intriguing to see the quick transformation of the formerly frantic 
crowd into quiet and attentive spectators in tune with Erdoğan’s rhythm. During his speech, 
the Prime Minister touched upon a wide spectrum of subject-matters mainly about his party’s 
successes and others’ failures as one would expect from a politician in the election eve. Yet, 
this self-praising opens toward a much broader historical context comprising the Ottoman and 
the republican eras. In other words, the Prime Minister presented his time in office as a major 
turning point in the whole Turkish history. Another detail to be dealt with was the shooting 
angle of a mobile video camera moving up and down behind the right-hand shoulder of the 
Prime minister. This was the angle which gave us some idea about the scale of this event: the 
number of spectators, lighting, size of the congress hall, and Erdoğan as the man apart and 
the great leader at the center of this organization.  
 The declaration of the project caused an immense reaction in the society, and it 
became a major topic in daily conservations, television discussion programs, news of mass 
media… Numerous individuals and institutions were consulted for their opinions which 
provided a wide range of perspectives. Television channels devoted extensive time to this 
issue while most columnists dedicated their columns to this topic in the days subsequent to 
the presentation event. For many of those who were supportive of the project, Kanal Istanbul 
symbolized the ‘developing Turkey’ in the sense that the country was strong enough to realize 
such a project. People from different professions ranging from real estate agents to economist 
assertively demonstrated their sophisticated knowledge regarding the construction process 
and its aftermath. ‘Men on the street’ – of whose ideas we can get a glimpse in street 
interviews – were often enthusiastic about the project: ‘Istanbul is now the center of the 
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world’ or ‘Turkey deserves such magnificent projects.’ Some praised themselves for having 
rightly guessed the content of the crazy project.  
 While the excitement was still palpable, Prime Minister Erdoğan continued to 
announce other ‘crazy projects’ during his rallies in other cities. The effect of the ‘crazy 
project’ swelled and spilled over Istanbul as crazy projects for other cities such as Izmir, 
Ankara, and Sinop started to be anounced in the weeks following the presentation of Kanal 
Istanbul. Ankara was going to be the global center of the defense industry.1 Izmir was 
promised more than thirty projects including satellite cities, two new city hospitals, a sub-sea 
tunnel connecting the two sides of the Izmir gulf, and so on.2 Sinop, on the other hand, was 
going to be an island like Istanbul.3 Kanal Istanbul did not only go beyond the provincial 
boundaries, but even offered news about the reactions of neighboring countries to the project. 
Financial Times published an analysis which took the issue from the perspective of 
international relations. According to the article, Turkey should maintain a delicate balance in 
its foreign policy inasmuch as Kanal Istanbul would entail a re-interpretation of the 1936 
Treaty of Montreux which frames all activities in the Bosporus.4 Erman Ilıcak, the chairman 
of a Turkish-origin construction firm which does business in Russia shared his thoughts with 
us about the possible reaction of ‘the Russians’. Against the predictions that Russia would 
cause complications concerning the Treaty of Montreux, he claimed that Russia would not 
hinder but support Kanal Istanbul since it would expedite the passage of Russian ships.5 “The 
crazy project intimidated the Greeks” was a headline based on another news which was 
published by a ‘news paper with high circulation’ involving some theories about how Turkey 
would strengthen her hand on the oil trade in the Mediterranean Sea.6 The ambition to pass 
over the national boundaries manifested itself in ‘surplus’ projects such as creating a star and 
                                                 
1 Bunlar da Ankara’nın çılgın projeleri. (2011, May 25). Zaman. Retrieved July 3, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1138601&title=bunlar-da-ankaranin-cilgin-projeleri&haberSayfa2 
 
2 Karasu, A.R. & Özkan Ö. (2011, June 4). İşte o çılgın 35 proje. Zaman. Retrieved July 3, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1142981&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
3 Sinop, “ada” oluyor. (2012, March 2). Zaman. Retrieved July 3, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1253729&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
4 Wright, R. (2011, Jun 27). Bosphorus Canal: Questions raised over a ‘crazy but magnificent’ project. Financial Times. 
Retrieved July 3, 2012, from  
 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2d911672-a081-11e0-b14e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1zYi8CydZ 
 
5 Akkan, F. & Kamburoğlu A. (2011, May 20). Ruslar ‘çılgın proje’ye engel değil destek olur. Zaman. Retrieved July 3, 
2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1136438&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
6 Çılgın proje Yunanlıları korkuttu. (2011, April 30). Milliyet. Retrieved July 3, 2012, from 
 http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/cilgin-proje-yunanlari-korkuttu/dunya/dunyadetay/30.04.2011/1384531/default.htm 
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crescent shaped island with the materials to be gained from the excavation for the project.7 
This gesture, as one may surmise without difficulty, aimed to place a signature on the surface 
of the world by ‘creating’ an island designed like the Turkish flag that could be seen from 
space.  
The frantic state was most obvious in the business sector where firms tried to get the 
copyrights of the ‘crazy projects’.8  In one of his speeches, Erdoğan mentioned a Turkish 
entrepreneur who was ready to invest thirty billion dollars in the project. Later, this 
mysterious businessman in question appeared and confirmed the Prime Minister’s statement 
as he claimed that “if this project would cost ten billion dollars, its return would be more than 
three hundred billion dollars” (İnan, 2011: my translation).9 Also, the company owned by this 
businessman released a commercial film demonstrating Istanbul as a futuristic – or rather 
fantastic – city with huge skyscrapers, flying cars, etc…10 In short, such entrepreneurial 
transactions in the business sector did not merely tout the crazy project, but they also 
reproduced the delirious mood encouraged by the ruling party’s electoral strategy.  
Not surprisingly, there has been much opposition to Erdoğan’s lofty project from the 
political realm, the civil society, and mass media. The main opposition party with Kemalist 
leanings, CHP (Republican People’s Party) chose to disregard the project by pointing at the 
more persistent and severe problems such as poverty or unemployment. The leader of CHP, 
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, remarked that the projects of the government, rather than merely being 
crazy should address the most urgent needs of the people. As an alternative to this large-scale 
project, Kılıçdaroğlu pronounced a more humble proposal: car carries between each side of 
the Bosporus with the aim of diminishing the traffic jam particularly on the bridges and 
generally in Istanbul.11 Also, investments of this kind prevalent during the era of 
                                                 
 
7 ‘Çılgın proje’ bir ada daha doğuruyor. (2011, May 5). Radikal. Retrieved July 3, 2012, from 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1048351&CategoryID=77 
Çılgın projenin hafriyatından ‘çılgın ada’ çıktı. (2011, May 6). Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://ekonomi.milliyet.com.tr/cilgin-projenin-hafriyatindan-cilgin-ada-
cikti/ekonomi/ekonomidetay/06.05.2011/1386746/default.htm 
‘Çılgın Proje’den çıkan hafriyatla ‘çılgın ada’ yapılacak. (2011, may 5). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1130368&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
8 ‘Kanal Istanbul’ marka olma yolunda. (2011, May 5). Milliyet. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://ekonomi.milliyet.com.tr/-kanal-istanbul-marka-olma-
yolunda/ekonomi/ekonomidetay/05.05.2011/1386392/default.htm 
 
9 O çılgın işadamı ortaya çıktı. (2011, May 3). Milliyet. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://ekonomi.milliyet.com.tr/o-cilgin-isadami-ortaya-cikti/ekonomi/ekonomidetay/03.05.2011/1385498/default.htm 
 
10 The commercial movie is an interesting combination of a futuristic narrative and Islamic teology. Futuristic images that 
were displayed throughout the film was espoused by the story of genesis. “We do not only building cities but also realizing 
what is already fated.”  Retrieved July 03, 2012, from   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mgu4DKedt38 
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developmentalism, such as factories to be founded in small cities with high unemployment 
rates, appeared to be the projects implied in this line of thinking.12 Kılıçdaroğlu expressed his 
main opposition with the statement that “there is no room for the human in this project.”13 A 
sarcastic response came from Nihat Ergin, the Minister of Science, Industry, and Technology: 
“They are saying that there is no human in it. This is not a swimming pool but a canal 
project.”14 The Prime Minister Erdoğan joined the tirade and digressed from the subject-
matter by accusing Kılıçdaroğlu and CHP of creating obstacles against the concrete projects 
and services that AKP had been producing with love and passion and of “digging a tunnel 
from CHP headquarters to Silivri15.”16 
The the third largest and ultra-nationalist party, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), 
claimed that AKP’s crazy project was a stolen idea which had originally been pronounced in 
the Democratic Leftist Party’s (DSP) election proclamation in the 1990s.17 This claim was 
then confirmed by the vice president of CHP.18 Prime Minister Erdoğan did not negate this 
claim, yet he argued that there is a difference between uttering and actually substantiating the 
project.19 Another contention brought forward by the deputy chairman of the Nationalist 
Movement Party was that Kanal Istanbul is nothing but an empty election promise of the 
ruling party to allure the voters.20 The president of MHP, on the other hand, referred to the 
growing income gap among the population caused by unjust distribution of wealth which in 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan ‘İstanbul trafiği’ projesi. (2011, April 30). Milliyet. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/kilicdaroglu-dan-istanbul-trafigi-projesi/siyaset/siyasetdetay/30.04.2011/1384463/default.htm 
12 Kılıçdaroğlu: Yeni CHP, halkın partisi. (2011, May 25). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
 http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1138714&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
13 Seven, E & Turan, O. (2011, April 29). Yeni Şafak. Projede maksat muhalefet olsun. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from  
http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?t=29.04.2011&i=316568 
 
14 “Bu yüzme havuzu değil kanal projesi.” Retrieved July 03, 2012, from http://www.kanalistanbulprojesi.web.tr/bu-yuzme-
havuzu-degil-kanal-projesi.html 
 
15 It is the name of the location of the penitentiary inhabiting a number of former ruling elite including political, intellectual 
and military figures who are accused of plotting coup against civil government. 
 
16 Erdoğan: Bu CHP’nin üstü şişhane altı kaval. (2011, May 4). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
 http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1130253&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
17 Çılgın değil çalınan proje. (2011, April 30). Milliyet. Retrieved Jul 03, 2012, from 
 http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/cilgin-degil-calinan-proje/siyaset/siyasetdetay/30.04.2011/1384224/default.htm 
 
18 Çılgın projeyi ilk Ecevit gündeme getirmişti. (2011, April 27). Milliyet. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/cilgin-projeyi-ilk-ecevit-gundeme-
getirmisti/siyaset/siyasetdetay/27.04.2011/1383138/default.htm 
 
19 Çılgın Proje’ye Ecevit’li savunma. (2011, April 29). Radikal.  Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&Date=29.4.2011&ArticleID=1047746&CategoryID=78 
 
20 ‘Başbakan heves pazarlıyor’. (2011, April 28). Milliyet. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
 http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/-basbakan-heves-pazarliyor-/siyaset/siyasetdetay/28.04.2011/1383630/default.htm 
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his view would be exacerbated with the crazy project.21      
According to the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), the formal representative of the 
Kurdish movement in the political realm, Kanal Istanbul was just a distraction from the real 
burning issues such as the Kurdish problem and the democratization of the Turkish state. 
Additionally, the former president of BDP, Hamit Geylani stated that his party was against all 
endeavors harmful to the environment.22 The Felicity Party (SP), founded by the hardliners of 
the Virtue Party (FP) from which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) emanated as the 
reformist wing, laid claim to Kanal Istanbul as its own project. The president of the party 
declared that the party’s Beyoğlu organization had been working on Kanal Istanbul for the 
last ten years.23 Şevket Kazan, a well-known figure in the circles of political Islam and who 
was at the time a parliamentarian candidate from SP, predicted that the project would be a 
nuisance for Turkey, as other regions would be neglected while all resources were being spent 
in Istanbul. To Kazan, it would be a wasteful project to spend excessive effort on making 
Istanbul a worldwide city instead of uplifting the country as a whole.24 Another argument 
presented by the party was that Kanal Istanbul would have no recuperative effect toward 
social peace and harmony.25  The People’s Voice Party (HAS Parti), another Islamist party 
which is distinguished by its critical stance against neoliberalism claimed that the project was 
no more than a dream insofar as neither environmental studies nor a preliminary examination 
of feasibility had been made. Numan Kurtulmuş, the president of the party, mockingly 
proposed to build a presidential palace for the Prime Minister with the materials to be gained 
from the excavation for the project.26 Two political parties unsuccessfully striving for the 
votes clustered in the center right, Truepath Party and the Party of Turkey, also argued for the 
                                                 
 
21 Bahçeli: Kanal İstanbul, soygun düzenini çılgınca sürdürecek bir projedir. (2011, May 7). Zaman.  Retrieved July 03, 
2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1131333&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
22 Geylani: Çılgın Proje, aldatmacadan başka bir şey değil. (2011, April 29). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
 http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1127798&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
23 Kamalak: Bu çılgın değil çalgın projedir. (2011, April 28). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1127205&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
24 Şevket Kazan: ‘Kanal İstanbul’ Türkiye’nin başına bela olur. (2011, April 29). Zaman.  
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1127751&keyfield=6B616E616C206973746 Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
16E62756C 
 
25 Yasin Hatipoğlu: 40 tane kanal açsan toplumsal huzura yetmez. (2011, May 1). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
 http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1128563&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
26 Kurtulmuş: Kanal’ın hafriyatıyla Başbakan’a boğazda başkanlık sarayı yapalım. (2011, May 3). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 
2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1129460&title=kurtulmus-kanalin-hafriyatiyla-basbakana-bogazda-baskanlik-
sarayi-yapalim&haberSayfa=1 
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unattainability of the project.27     
 The project did not only become the primary issue in media coverage, but it also 
created a certain extent of hysteria in mass media as several names frantically compete with 
each other in order to inform their readers about the content of the project. This in itself 
turned into a display of superiority as each journalist/opinion leader pompously demonstrated 
how deep his knowledge was and how accurate his sources from the intelligentsia within the 
ruling party were. Apart from that, there were diverse reactions and opinions in the media. 
Kanal Istanbul was unsurprisingly advocated by pointing to the habitual arguments of the the 
capitalist rhetoric. It was claimed that the project would be a pristine terrain for new 
investments28 and a source of supply to the national economy in the future.29 As a pre-
emptive argument against the possible criticisms regarding the project’s enormous cost, it 
was also claimed that the project would pay for itself in a short period of time, as fast as 
fifteen years.30 Another usual statement of assurance was that millions of unemployed people 
would be employed after the realization of the project.31 Along with such economy-based 
advocacies, Kanal Istanbul was surprisingly presented as ecologically more favorable in 
relation to its being an alternative route alongside the natural Bosporus for the heavy traffic 
of oil tankers.32 What is interesting though is that despite Kanal Istanbul’s being an urban 
project by definition, the focus of debates around Kanal Istanbul was not the advantages of 
the project for urban development. Although there were some news about the project’s 
possible returns such as new areas of employment, attraction of international investments or 
                                                 
 
27 Şener: Çılgın proje seçim polemiğidir unutulur. (2011, April 27). Milliyet. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/sener-cilgin-proje-secim-polemigidir-
unutulur/siyaset/siyasetdetay/27.04.2011/1383159/default.htm 
Açıkgöz: Kanal projesi gerçekleştirilemeyecek olduğundan adına ‘Çılgın’ dendi. (2011, April 30). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 
2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1128196&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
28 Demir, A. (2011, April 30). ‘Kanal İstanbul’ projesi yeni yatırımlara kapı açacak. Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1128598&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
29 Baysal, E. (2011, April 30). Çılgın projenin ekonomiye katkısı 50 milyar dolar. Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1127958&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
Bakan Şimşek: Çılgın proje vergi gelirlerini artıracak proje. (2011, April 30). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1128204&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
30 Kılıç, Y. (2011, April 29). ‘Çılgın proje 15 yılda masrafını çıkarır’. Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
 http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1127539&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
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‘better’ urbanization 33, only a small number of opinion leaders in the mass media touched 
upon the actual advantages of the project.  
Apart from those who openly opposed this project from various perspectives, it would 
be interesting to mention some columnists, many of whom are known as the liberals close to 
the ruling party. They reacted in a restrained fashion by applauding AKP’s visionary policies 
while reminding the pending problems and soliciting the government to act with the same 
courage and vision in order to solve them. The most popular rhetorical move was to point at 
the pending reforms of EU accession and other urgent issues as the real ‘crazy projects 
waiting to be realized. To put it in simple terms, what this group of people posited was that 
the real crazy project would respond to the real top priority needs, for instance the 
comprehensive reforms required in the process of accession to EU.34 Making provisions 
against the inevitable earthquake expected to take place in Istanbul in the near future was 
another such matter.35 Yet, another proposal of a ‘crazy project’ was stabilizing the economic 
variables and creating a less risky domestic economy.36 The importance attributed to the ‘real’ 
crazy projects such as the agenda of EU reforms is so great that achieving this, it is believed, 
will be a recipe for all the existing problems of Turkey ranging from the restrictions on the 
freedom of expression to the Kurdish issue.37 This is, of course, attributing too much 
importance and credit to the EU reform program and probably the people who defend this 
view are very well aware of that. However, this is a routine rhetorical tactic used by liberals 
who tend to support the government’s actions in order to entice, or perhaps to seduce, the 
decision-makers and to make them pursue more ‘sober-minded’ policies and act in 
accordance with democratic values. One of the objectives of this research is to show that this 
                                                 
 
33 Altan, M. (2011, April 28). Çılgın projenin çipi. Star. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
 http://www.stargazete.com/politika/yazar/mehmet-altan/cilgin-projenin-cipi-haber-347531.htm 
Başyurt, E. (2011, April 28).  Ezber bozan çılgınlık. Bugün. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
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Ünal, A. (2011, April 25). Çılgın Proje. Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=1125773 
 
34 Berkan, İ. (2011, April 29). Esas çılgın proje ne olurdu biliyor musunuz? Hürriyet. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/17662924_p.asp 
 
35 Özgentürk, J. (2011, October 26). Deprem daha çılgın. Radikal. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
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36 Yıldırım, S. (2011, April 30). Başbakan’ın asıl ‘çılgın proje’si. Radikal. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1047781&Yazar=SERVET-
YILDIRIM&CategoryID=101 
 
37 Altan, A. (2011, May 1). Berkan’ın çılgın projesi. Taraf. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
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kind of stance means ‘missing the whole point’ about the politics of the AKP which operates 
on the ‘non-rational’ aspect of the society such as collective enjoyment (jouissance). 
   What appeared as the most intriguing response in the media, on the other hand, was 
to endorse the project and to praise the Prime Minister Erdoğan as the mastermind of this 
extremely ambitious enterprise with respect to his ‘thinking-big’ and unique vision38. 
Erdoğan’s intelligence was boldly underscored along with his claimed righteousness and 
unwavering commitment to serving the people.39 The corrupt and already outmoded 
mentality of the Kemalist regime, as the Ergenekon narratives40 describe it, was contrasted 
with Erdoğan’s ‘path-breaking’ and noble weltanschauung.41 The Prime Minister and his 
party were also hailed as the authors of a genius political maneuver in the eve of general 
elections. It was suggested that the announcement of the project should be seen independently 
of its content and feasibility. To put it in simple terms, the fact that Erdoğan declared such a 
daring project and succeeded to manufacture consent for his agenda in itself deserved to be 
extolled regardless of project’s ‘doability’. It was not merely the potency of the government 
but also the inaptitude of the opposition. While the dynamism and ingenuity of the AKP’s 
project is eulogized greatly, the inability of the political opposition to offer anything that can 
compete with Kanal Istanbul is asserted in order to emphasize their incommensurability with 
the government’s merits.42   
The project ceased to be an agenda topic and sank into oblivion in the aftermath of the 
elections. This smooth process of ‘disenchantment’ from the delirious experience of enjoying 
the crazy project may evoke the formula of conventional politics: far-fetched political 
promises given prior to the elections are doomed to be neglected and forgotten afterwards. 
However, one should also avoid repeating here the conventional Kemalist argument, still 
                                                 
38 Beki, A. (2011, April 28). Erdoğan’ın zeka gösterisi. Radikal.  Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1047612&Yazar=AK%DDF%20BEK%DD&Date
=28.04.2011&CategoryID=98 
 
39 Taşgetiren, A. (2011, April 28). Tarih yazmak. Bugün. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.bugun.com.tr/kose-yazisi/152421-tarih-yazmak-makalesi.aspx 
 
40 Öztürk, İ. (2011, May 2). ‘Çılgın proje’. Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=1128830 
 
41 Ibid.  
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prevalent in the context of Turkey, according to which people are not enlightened or well-
educated enough to claim their rights in the public sphere vis-à-vis the political authority. I 
believe that a paradigmatic shift is in question altering the mode of interaction between the 
ordinary voter who allegedly makes his/her choice by rationally calculating the possible gain 
and loss, and the political elite who tries to entice the former by presenting appealing 
promises to be, more or less, realized in order to extend its reign. Another way of 
understanding this would correspond to the notion of ‘end of promise’ concurrent with 
utopia’s fall from grace in the realm of politics (Ranciere, 2007). Here, it would not be far-
fetched to claim that this sort of political paradigm is somewhat linked to neoliberalism, 
which cannot be reduced to a set of economic principles but also corresponds to a certain 
politico-aesthetic discourse. Therefore, this inquiry will try to discuss this sort of political 
paradigm in its relation to Turkey’s experience of neoliberalization and look for the dominant 
politico-aesthetic trends cherishing certain types of collective desire and enjoyment. In other 
words, one of the major concerns of this research is to contextualize this mise-en-scene in 
which people did not postpone their satisfaction until the actualization of the project in the 
case of announcing Kanal Istanbul but instantly enjoyed the promise itself rather than 
restraining the satisfaction until its realization in an uncertain future.   
In the case of Kanal Istanbul, a collective imaginary, especially endemic to 
conservative circles in the media, was to postulate a historical lineage between the visionary 
leaders and the Prime Minister Erdoğan in terms of creating projects changing the landscape 
of Istanbul.43 Some preferred to describe Erdoğan as a master builder, an artist, a dreamer and 
a futurist.44 However, it is mostly the Islamic heritage of the city with which Kanal Istanbul 
is associated. Hence, the claimed continuity between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the 
historical figures is narrowed down to Ottoman sultans rather than extending back to the 
Christian Byzantine past. This link between the glorious figures in the past and the 
contemporary political leader is not merely based on the interpretations of commentators and 
columnists. Two particular names come to mind at this point with regard to their reputation 
for manipulating the landscape or challenging its limits: Mehmet II and Sokollu Mehmet, the 
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grand vizier of Suleyman, Selim II and Murat III. Mehmet II is extolled for his strategic move 
of by-passing the Byzantine barricades and traps at the straits of the Golden Horn by hauling 
his battleships through the land with the help of a greased platform during the siege of 
Constantinapolis. The latter is most famous for his endeavors to open a canal in Suez that 
would link the Ottoman armada directly to the Indian Ocean.  
The Prime Minister Erdoğan himself implied this kind of continuity in his loaded 
language. Suffice it to remember his reference to ‘Ferhat and Sirin’, originally a Persian saga, 
which tells of an impossible worldly love sublimated to a divine love later on within an 
ascetic context. It is the part in which the male protagonist pierces mountains in order to 
attain his beloved that Erdoğan referred to while announcing his project which includes a 
remarkable alteration in the landscape for the sake of his beloved, the ‘people’. During his 
speech in the event of presenting the project to the public, Erdoğan alluded to a series of 
Turkic monarchs by emphasizing the importance of dreams which had become glorious 
realities: 
… Man lives as long as he dreams on Earth. Sultan Alparslan dreamed and opened the 
gates of Anatolia to enlightenment. Ertugrul Ghazi saw a dream in which burgeons 
growing out of his chest turned into a sycamore stretching from Danube to 
Euphrates/Tigris, from the Nile to Drina and he planted the seeds of a world empire, 
the Ottoman State, while chasing this dream. Mehmet the Conqueror dreamed and 
moved his ships over land. In this way, he put an end to a dark era and initiated a 
golden age. The Suleymaniye Mosque at the outset ornamented the dreams of Mimar 
Sinan, subsequently it became the pearl of Istanbul. The Selimiye Mosque became the 
pearl of Edirne, Turkey and of the world in general. There have always been dream 
and profound imagination behind domes, madrassah, monuments, libraries, unique 
lines of poetry. The triumph in the Battle of Gallipoli is the achievement of Mustafa 
Kemals, of commanders with imagination who can dream of freedom. The 
Independence War and the Turkish Republic is the opus of Anatolia and Thrace that 
can dream. Dream is the seed planted in reality… There is dream beforehand before 
foundation of all great civilizations (Erdoğan, 2011: my translation).45 
 
It is also possible to witness a conspicuously transgressive dimension which is not 
specific to the case of Kanal Istanbul. One would not be wrong to suspect that an enjoyment 
emanating from violating the long-established norms and rules was being shared by the 
political power and ‘ordinary’ subjects. Not only barren bureaucratic limitations but also 
moral codes are to be violated in venturing on such a mass-scale project. Along with the 
regulations of bureaucracy, issues like the protection of the environment, housing rights, and 
urban planning are not simply neglected but even presented as impediments against the 
                                                 
45 To read the full text of Erdoğan’s speech in the presentation of Kanal Istanbul:  http://www.habergo.com/haber/23273/iste-
erdoganin-cilgin-proje-konusmasi-ve-projenin-animasyonu-izle-video-27042011.html 
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development of Turkey. While the topic was still hot, some commentators drew attention to 
the growing ‘energy’ in the society that was trying to free itself from its confines.46 In this 
line of thinking, the declaration of the project pointed to the fact that in the reign of the AKP 
government Turkey got rid of the shackles that had been imprisoning the country’s immense 
potential and opened the path that would lead the country to grandiosity and “the level of 
contemporary civilization” (Atatürk, 1927). ‘Rampant horse’ and ‘restless tiger’ are claimed 
to be the two symbols that can properly depict the current position of Turkey.47 Imagining a 
prospering country breaking away from its chains does not only legitimize the transgression 
of conventional rules and values but it also fosters a certain kind of enjoyment: a 
‘transgressive jouissance’. Throughout this thesis, the notion of transgression will be 
discussed on the axis of Kemalist modernity and neoliberalism inasmuch as the ‘crazy 
project’ appears to bear features of both paradigms. The modernist approach ‘enframes’ space 
through disciplinary technologies since it conceives of it as static, passive, and empty. As it 
will be stressed in the following chapters, the Kemalist nation-building program included a 
pedagogical, disciplinary, and radical re-organization of social space in order to ‘create’ its 
modern citizens. While incorporating the former’s properties to a large extent, neoliberalism, 
on the other hand, drops the disciplinary tendencies, and embraces an ‘aesthetic populism’ 
(Jameson, 1991).  Moreover, interaction with space in the neoliberal paradigm is based on 
neoliberalism’s peculiar economic tenets – efficiency, globalization, consumerism, 
gentrification, etc…    
At this juncture, it would be productive to touch upon the link between political power 
and the hegemonic spatial practices in various geographical-temporal contexts. Especially, 
the political economic perspective comes to the forefront with regard to the type of 
relationship between ruling political parties and the locomotive sector of the national 
economy in a neoliberal context. Fredric Jameson asserts that “[a]rchitecture is business as 
well as culture; and outright value fully as much as ideal representation” in order to point the 
economic forces as one of the determinant factors not to be overlooked while writing about 
                                                 
 
46 Türköne, M. (2011, April 29). En çılgın proje. Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=1127436 
Beki, A. (2011, April 28). Erdoğan’ın zeka gösterisi. Radikal.  Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1047612&Yazar=AK%DDF%20BEK%DD&Date
=28.04.2011&CategoryID=98 
Taşgetiren, A. (2011, April 28). Tarih yazmak. Bugün. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.bugun.com.tr/kose-yazisi/152421-tarih-yazmak-makalesi.aspx 
 
47 Türköne, M. (2011, April 29). En çılgın proje. Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=1127436 
 
17 
 
architecture (Jameson, 2005: 243). According to Jameson, architecture is the first artistic and 
cultural category that responds to the vacillations and paradigmatic shifts in the realm of 
economy (Jameson, Is Space Political?, 2005). In this line of thinking, it is no surprise that 
architecture appears to be the most conservative artistic practice with respect to its practical 
feature and the vast capital it requires. Experimental endeavors are quite few in numbers, as 
they usually prove to be costly and unaffordable until new advanced techniques and materials 
start to replace the traditional methods of design and construction Invalid source specified. 
(Tafuri, 1996).  
However, it would also be erroneous to conceive of architecture as a discipline wholly 
confined within the domain of economy, rationality and utility and to evaluate the form of 
any architectural design with regard to its ‘function’. The major ideological objective of the 
Modern Movement, which “encompassed a revolutionary aesthetic canon and a scientific 
doctrine in architecture originating in Europe during the interwar period,” was to transcend 
ideology (Bozdoğan, 2001: 4). In his response to this approach represented by prominent 
figures such as Le Corbusier, Adolf Loos and the Bauhaus school, Theodor Adorno attacks 
the assumed boundary between the functional and the ornamental by asserting that the form 
of function is always-already dependent upon cultural, historical, political and socio-
economic contexts. In Adorno’s view, the functionalist trend that omits ornamental 
characteristics in architectural designs is in fact an aesthetic choice per se (Adorno, 2005).  In 
accordance with Adorno’s deduction, Slavoj Zizek articulates that the concept of ‘utility’ 
obscures the ideological register by making us believe that there is an ‘extra-ideological’ 
stratum of everyday life. In Zizek’s formulation, for ideology to function properly, its 
inherent antagonisms must be projected onto the extra-ideological strata of the material 
world.48 Hence, one should be extra cautious in the face of concepts such as utility insofar as 
the kernel of ideology is situated at the point where it is believed to be suspended (Zizek, 
1999).  
According to Henri Lefebvre, the permanence of ideology depends on its ability to 
demarcate the territory under its control in order to reproduce the preferred set of relations on 
this clearly defined space (Lefebvre, 1998). David Harvey, on the other hand, suggests that 
                                                 
48 Here, Zizek elaborates Althusser’s examination Ideological State Apparatuses as bearers and executors of ideology and of 
their importance in reproducing the conditions of production. “If the ISAs ‘function’ massively and predominantly by 
ideology, what unifies their diversity is precisely this functioning, in so far as the ideology by which they function is always 
in fact unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the ideology of the ruling 
class.” From “Ideology and Ideological State Appratuses,” by L. Althusser, in Mapping Ideology, (ed.) Slavoj Zizek, 1994, 
London, Verso, p.110. 
 
18 
 
the permanence of social relations comprising discontinuities as well as continuities requires 
occupancy of the space demarcated by ideology. In Harvey’s perspective, it is in this way that 
the production of space through a series of social, economic, cultural and political relations 
becomes a major activity – which is both conscious and unconscious – in the construction of 
collective identities and subject-positions (Harvey, 1997). Processes of hegemony 
construction as in the cases of nation-building projects and the institution of capitalist 
relations involve effective production of space in order to establish and maintain a certain set 
of relations. The emergence of modern spatial practices accelerated in the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-centuries has become the focus of several thinkers, most importantly Michel 
Foucault and Jacques Lacan. Their most critical intervention is to re-conceptualize the 
internal-external duality on the axis of the self and its surroundings. Most roughly, the critical 
intervention of these scholars can be summarized as the insight that the subject is not a self-
contained entity, and even the most ‘innermost’ features of subjectivity are immanently linked 
with the alleged material externality (Lacan, 1994) (Foucault, 1986).  
Hegemony constitution through spatial practices, economic relations in the 
construction sector, and the politico-aesthetic expressions of architecture do not solely 
concern actual materiality. Categories such as politics, architecture and the activity of 
construction are not to be confined to their actual aspects but to be seen in their virtuality as 
well, especially in this phase of history. There are various approaches which construe 
architecture as signification, texture, and representation: “Architecture is not only the built 
form… but also a discursive and visual practice that embraces the ‘word’ and the ‘image’” 
(Özkaya, 2006: 183). In his analysis of urban semiology, Roland Barthes rejects the notion of 
“one-to-one symbolism” operative in the “dead part of Freud’s work”49 (Barthes, 1997: 161). 
In another article, he gives an account of how Paris throughout the nineteenth- twentieth-
centuries has been transformed into a visual totality, an “euphoria of aerial vision”, from the 
vantage of Eiffel Tower – which according to him is a virtually empty sign – so as to satisfy 
the visual experience of the urban population during their recreational time (Barthes, 1997). 
Paul Virilio is one of the prominent scholars who insert the digital registers into their 
discussions of architecture and urban space. According to Virilio, boundaries in city 
landscapes are endowed with more and more immaterial elements.   
In effect, we are witnessing a paradoxical moment in which the opacity of building 
materials is reduced to zero. With the invention of the steel skeleton construction, 
                                                 
49 Here, Barthes is probably refering to Sigmund Freud’s ‘Interpretation of Dreams’ in which he tries to capture the truth of 
dreams (the manifest content) through a close reading of symbols (latent form). As a structuralist, in his early career at least, 
Barthes justifies the discordance between the signifier and the signified.  
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curtain walls made of light and transparent materials, such as glass or plastics, replace 
stone façades, just as tracing paper, acetate and plexi-glass replace the opacity of 
paper in the designing phase [...] Deprived of objective boundaries, the architectonic 
element begins to drift and float in an electronic ether, devoid of spatial dimensions, 
but inscribed in the singular temporality of an instantaneous diffusion. From here on, 
people can’t be separated by physical obstacles or by temporal distances. With the 
interfacing of computer terminals and video monitors, distinctions of here and there 
no longer mean anything (Virilio, 1997: 360). 
 
Aside from this trend of the immaterilization and digitalization of everyday spatiality, 
it is possible to argue that architecture by virtue of imaginary and textual dimensions can also 
be experienced virtually. Thanks to the broad coverage and ubiquitous advertisements of 
construction firms, gated communities and shopping malls both in printed and visual media, 
subjects as spectators can imagine and conceive of the city topography on a virtual plane.   
Here, it would be helpful to allude to Slavoj Zizek’s discussion about the ‘spectralization of 
the fetish’ within the context of ‘postmodern’ capitalism in order to understand this elusive, in 
a way paradoxical, interaction between actuality and virtuality:  
… [I]n our postmodern age, what we witness is the gradual dissipation of the very 
materiality of the fetish. With the prospect of electronic money, money loses its 
material presence and turns into a purely virtual entity (accessible by means of a bank 
card or even an immaterial computer code); this dematerialization, however, only 
strengthens its hold: money (the intricate network of financial transactions) thus turns 
into an invisible, and for that reason all-powerful, spectral frame which dominates our 
lives. One can now see in what precise sense production itself can serve as a fetish: 
the postmodern transparency of the process of production is false in so far as it 
obfuscates the immaterial order which effectively runs the show […] Again, the 
paradox is that with this spectralization of the fetish, with the progressive 
disintegration of its positive materiality, its presence becomes even more oppressive 
and all-pervasive, as if there is no way the subject can escape its hold… (Zizek, 
1997a: 102-103). 
 
In the light of what has been said so far, the aim of this study is to offer an alternative 
perspective to formulate the case of Kanal Istanbul in particular and the fault lines of 
enjoyment within the new political paradigm evoking crazy projects. In this regard, rather 
than “the values of the tactile, the tectonic, and the telluric” features, this research will focus 
on the virtual aspect of space (Jameson, 1997: 238). More accurately, the social and political 
imaginary of space will be discussed together with the hegemonic narratives on the questions 
of architecture and construction.  
In his presentation of Kanal Istanbul, Erdoğan underlined the primacy of ‘dream’ in 
the mega-projects of Turkish history, such as the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, the 
construction of Mimar Sinan’s architectural masterpieces, and the ‘victory’ in the Battle of 
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Gallipoli against Britain – the superpower at the time. Then the question to be raised is what 
kind of dream(s) the modern-day ‘crazy project’ corresponds to. One may invoke 
psychoanalysis if dreams are at stake. In this respect, it would be productive to consult 
psychoanalysis, especially Jacques Lacan’s revision of Freud’s works. The tripartite structure 
of Lacanian psychoanalysis, which is combined of the ‘Imaginary’, the ‘Symbolic’, and the 
‘Real’, offers a roadmap in our interpretation of dreams revolving around the phenomenon of 
Kanal Istanbul. In this particular situation, the Lacanian framework will come in handy 
because Kanal Istanbul takes place predominantly on the virtual plane and it is very much 
about the collective imaginary, identification, and enjoyment. Moreover, Lacanian theory is 
particularly enlightening about late capitalism and the enjoyment regimes it brings about. 
One should acknowledge that Kanal Istanbul has several dimensions interacting with power 
and ideology but it is also important to contextualize it and insist on its commodity feature 
against the neoliberal background. Accordingly, the fetishistic character of this probably 
never-to-be-realized project will be put under scrutiny by making use of various concepts in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. As one can surmise from the choice of a project such as Kanal 
Istanbul that does not actually exist yet, the focus of this research will not be the subjects’ 
interactions with their material surroundings. The main focus of this thesis is instead how the 
AKP hegemony has instituted itself by operating on its subjects’ interaction with the 
imaginary aspect of space through virtuality and the symbolic order. Since the notion of 
subjectivity within the virtual realm is another issue vehemently debated in contemporary 
psychoanalytical literature with reference to all three Lacanian registers, ‘the Imaginary’, ‘the 
Symbolic’, and ‘the Real’, Lacanian psychoanalysis will appropriately draw the framework 
of this study in order to grasp different subject-positions within virtual reality. At this point, 
the concept of ‘interpassivity’ will offer insightful and inspiring, albeit counter-intuitive, 
ways of conceptualizing the well-established and ossified dualities: subjective/objective, 
active/passive… Moreover, interpassivity, as will be stressed later on, is intrinsically 
connected to enjoyment, or to be more accurate, it is about how the subject relates to and 
deals with the radically destructive effects of both its own and the Other’s jouissance.  
Another guideline of this research is Cihan Tuğal’s inspiring work, Passive 
Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, regarding the book’s 
examination of the process of the AKP’s hegemony constitution. In his book, Tuğal gives an 
outline of the shifts and oscillations within the Islamist movement for the last three decades, 
and offers a detailed analysis of how the pro-capitalist branch of the Islamic movement, 
namely the AKP, became triumphant and constituted its hegemony. Tuğal’s study provides a 
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great number of original insights about AKP’s hegemony, since it focuses on micro-level 
discursive operations. While doing that, however, Tuğal does not refrain from making 
deductions about the big picture which, from his standpoint, can be summarized as follows: 
The ‘organic crisis’ between civil and political societies that had arisen in the context of 
neoliberalization was solved after the AKP managed to found its hegemony by normalizing 
capitalist relations in almost all sectors of the society. In order to manage that, according to 
Tuğal, the AKP heavily invests on shaping everyday life through spatial arrangements in 
accordance with late capitalist tenets. Although Tuğal’s work is quite insightful and 
illustrative in articulating the experience of the AKP, there are some aspects remained 
unexamined which are crucial in explaining the party’s success in instituting its hegemony. 
One of those aspects is affect – or the realm of ‘the Real’ in Lacanian psychoanalysis – which 
can be described as that which is not yet symbolized. In addition to emotions, ineffable 
registers are not merely resorted to the processes of hegemony construction but they also play 
a cardinal role in determining human subjectivity. Since Tuğal lays his theoretical base on 
Antonio Gramsci’s works, such registers are not adequately emphasized – if not totally 
negated – and that their decisiveness especially in contemporary politics is often overlooked. 
Another drawback of Tuğal’s study may be linked to its date of publishing which does not 
cover the last three years. During this period, the AKP has undergone a drastic change as the 
formerly dominant attitudes such as the political pragmatism and professionalism of the party 
were replaced by a palpably nationalist and etatist political stance. One of the wagers of this 
study is to investigate the blueprint of two politico-aesthetic trends visible in the party’s 
hegemonic spatial practices: the nationalist and developmentalist discourse of the early 
republican era and the neoliberal urban policies prevalent in Turkey from the 1980s on. 
In the first chapter, a brief historical account of Istanbul’s last three decades will be 
given. Since, this period is saturated with myriad political vicissitudes, the historical 
background of the city is intertwined with the social, cultural and economic, as well as 
political patterns operative both at the national and the global level. It is crucial to take all 
these levels together into account and mention the relationships among them so as to provide 
a more accurate understanding of what has been going on in Istanbul along with other global 
cities in recent decades. Therefore, the process of neoliberalization will occupy a central role 
since it has changed the political economy as well as the urban landscape and demography in 
a drastic fashion. This radical transformation devastated the former social and political order, 
and it caused a ‘discrepancy’ between the civil and political societies. Cihan Tuğal refers to 
this discrepancy with a term he borrows from Gramsci, ‘organic crisis’ (Tuğal, Passive 
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Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, 2009). Oscillations of this 
organic crisis will be the undercurrent in our account of the last three decades of Istanbul in 
particular and Turkey in general. While the AKP is an ardent deployer of neoliberal policies 
in many respects, one should consider the fact that a crises caused by the exclusionary 
mechanism of neoliberalism was solved by the same party. Therefore, this chapter will deal 
with the distinguishing characteristics of the AKP hegemony as well as the party’s 
congruence with neoliberal values.   
The following chapter will venture on a comparison between two different types of 
hegemony in the modern history of Turkey, between the early republican era and the last ten 
years under the AKP rule, with reference to how they narrativize and conceive of space, 
architecture, and construction. Rather than delving into a semiotic reading of dominant 
architectural styles in these two settings, we will be concerned with the ‘imaginaries’ of these 
different hegemonic orders by looking at their discourses on architecture and construction. 
This approach will be productive given that the members of the party have more and more 
used a language that is similar to the developmentalist and nationalist tones of the early 
republican discourse. Additionally, over the last five years, the professional attitude striving 
for efficiency formerly dominant in the party’s spatial practices seems to lose its primary 
position as aesthetics of grandeur and national pride have become ostensible in the AKP’s 
spatial program. In this respect, it is legitimate to look for parallelisms between the Kemalist 
nation-building program and the AKP’s spatial politics even though political-Islam and 
Kemalism are usually considered as antithetical to each other.   
However, the whole experience of the AKP is not simply a – rather bizarre – mixture 
of neoliberal and Kemalist/developmentalist discourses. In addition to those, AKP hegemony 
is very much about the politics of emotions and enjoyment. Therefore, what resists and 
remains outside the discursive analysis will be the major concern of the last chapter. In order 
to discuss this sort of register that resists analysis and any type of symbolization, we will call 
upon Lacanian psychoanalysis due to its apt conceptualizations of the ineffable. The complex 
relations between the three Lacanian registers, namely the ‘Symbolic’, the ‘Imaginary’, and 
the ‘Real’ will be handled so as to acquire a theoretical framework in our conceptualization of 
the ‘inconceptualizable’. In our theoretical discussion, the role of spatiality and the link 
between transgression and enjoyment will be of central importance. The notion of 
transgression, on the other hand, will be stressed in relation to the social and political 
fantasies about bureaucracy and public law in Turkey. Moreover, we will embark on a 
detailed discussion of ‘interpassivity’ by alluding to the pertinent works of Slavoj Zizek to 
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approach the issue of Kanal Istanbul from an original and productive perspective. The 
concept of interpassivity will provide us with new ways of articulating the boundaries drawn 
between subject and object, human beings and things as in the case of the crazy project.  
Against this backdrop, our debate will revolve around the enjoyment regimes employed by 
the AKP hegemony. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
ISTANBUL’S RESTRUCTURATION AS A ‘GLOBAL CITY’ IN THE 
AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM 
 
 
 
Neoliberalism with its far-reaching consequences on all aspects of life doubtless has decisive 
effects on urban landscapes where socio-economic relations are more concentrated compared 
to other spaces. Not only the fields specifically believed to be determined by macroeconomic 
variables, but also day-to-day practices have been altered remarkably through spatial 
regulations along with neoliberal provisions and tenets. Cities have particularly come into 
prominence as consumption and recreation centers inasmuch as they started to become 
autonomous from the economic forces of nation-states. Up until the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, a national economy planned, regulated and even led by the central 
government had been the ideal type in the Western-oriented developing countries. Yet, the 
two successive oil crises in the 1970s undermined this prevailing economic order that had 
been considerably stable for two decades. Consequently, the existing economic regime 
became unsustainable inasmuch as everyone but most notably the countries pursuing Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies started to have budget deficits along with 
skyrocketing oil prices, and hence increased production costs. In response to this situation, an 
alternative economic vision, neoliberalism that had been incubating for three decades came to 
the forefront and presented itself as the way out of this deadlock (Mudge, 2008). Economies 
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in huge debts unexpectedly found themselves at the pocket of bankers and those who held the 
finance capital.  Since this school of economics was considerably recognized in circles of 
finance all around the world, the bail-out of bankrupted economies took place in accordance 
to neoliberal principles (Harvey, Neoliberalism as creative destruction, 1988).  
In contrast to an economy constituted in line with Keynesian principles, neoliberalism 
favors the supply side over the demand side of the economy by enforcing macroeconomic 
discipline through budget-cuts and privatization rather than pursuing full employment 
policies with high wages in order to increase the aggregate demand by sustaining a high level 
of purchasing power for the masses. As an outcome of these policy changes in line with 
neoliberal tenets, capital is not anymore embedded in and dependent on national boundaries. 
Capital, in the context of neoliberalism, becomes more and more international, financial, and 
thus volatile. Cities, on the other hand, have gradually oriented themselves as individual 
actors competing with each other in order to attract this volatile and wayward international 
capital (Keyder, 1993). To achieve this goal, urban dynamics are subjected to free-market 
rules, and the city landscape is restructured in order to address the aesthetic and security 
concerns of capital. The global city is to turn into a showcase offering some extent of 
‘exoticism’ in order to arouse interest. Yet, this exotic touch should be confined to the 
boundaries of reliability and predictability so that the capital can feel itself safe while 
contemplating the aesthetic properties of the city. A corollary of conducting an urban 
transformation along these variables is the ‘aesthetization’50 of the city in which an 
exclusively visual relation takes place with the urban landscape while its tactile and visceral 
features are simply ignored. Consequently, the parts to be ‘spared’ to the fancy of 
international capital undergo a transformation which distinguishes them from other districts 
of the city, and this visual differentiation creates an invisible wall between disadvantageous 
urban population whose movements are now restricted and those who have the resources to 
benefit from the now-aestheticized city. Spatial segregation goes hand in hand with income 
                                                 
50 The notion of ‘aesthetization’ which usually has a negative connotation should not be confused with the concept of 
aesthetics. The term aesthetics became popular among the eighteenth century philosophers who contemplated on subjects 
such as art and beauty. Although it was Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten who introduced the term to philosophical inquiry, 
Immanual Kant’s works have deservedly been the major source of the conceptualization of aesthetics. In “Crititique of 
Aesthetic Judgement,” Kant investigates the quality of aesthetic judgement and argues that aesthetic judgement operates 
where cognitive-intellectual faculties fail. In this line of thinking, Sigmund Freud contributes to the discussion in his ground-
breaking study on the term, ‘Unmheimlich’, or ‘uncanny’. According to Freud, aesthetics is not a theory of beauty but of 
qualites of feeling. In his view, the study of aesthetics sheds light upon the provinces of unrepresentable and ineffable 
registers – one of which is the subject of the ‘uncanny’. ‘Aesthetization’, on the other hand, is a notorious concept ascribed 
to Walter Benjamin’s examination of fascism – “aesthetization of politics.” In a nutshell, “aeshetization of politics” describes 
a scene where politics is deprived of its content (conflicts, contradictions and antagonisms), and it is reduced to a mere art 
‘form’. By the same token, the aesthetization of everyday life in the context of neoliberalism implies a hegemonic strategy 
aiming at transforming subjects’ daily experiences into aesthetic projects to be realized through consumption.  
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inequality as the earned rights of the wage-earners gradually erode concomitantly with the 
blurring of the boundary between legal and illegal (Yardımcı, 2005). The whole urban 
infrastructure, the political economy and the aesthetic formations of the city center(s) are 
reconfigured in line with the necessities of the global market of finance and tourism by 
introducing new legislative framework so as to extend the powers of the municipality 
apparatus. Valuable lands are now served on a silver platter to the upper (-middle) classes 
while working class members and the urban poor are dislodged from their settlements. This 
process of gentrification also brings about new visual and aesthetic regimes as well as 
restructuring the social, economic and political aspects of city life.  
 
 
Early Stages of Neoliberalization and the Emergence of Istanbul as a ‘Global City’ 
 
 Istanbul, as well as Turkey in general, has been the emblematic stage of the above-
mentioned transition. In the aftermath of WWII, mechanization and industrialization 
accelerated, most prominently in the rural areas, thanks to the profound support of the USA at 
the outset of the bipolar international system of the Cold War era. Starting from the 1960s, a 
state-led developmental program, Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) became the 
official economic policy as in many other ‘developing’ countries in the context of the Cold 
War. ISI was basically about establishing a domestic industrial infrastructure by importing 
technology, capital goods/inputs temporarily and catering the locally manufactured final 
product to the state-protected domestic market (Gülalp, 2001). Consequently, agriculture-led 
national development was replaced by an extensive industrialization process which led to a 
dramatic demographic change as masses migrated from the countryside to industrial town-
centers (Pamuk, 1998) (Keyder, 1999). Since the insufficient inclusionary mechanisms of the 
Turkish state had long failed to provide shelter to the large number of people rushing to urban 
areas, a squatter housing type, gecekondu, had been the solution to the problem of 
accommodation. State officials turned a blind eye while government properties were 
unofficially allocated to the new settlers (Geniş, 2007). An informal and self-feeding system 
emerged out of this picture where a quasi-patronage relationship between the gecekondu 
dwellers and political power-holders had been at work.  
This state of affairs became impossible in the 1980s as the scope and pace of 
migration from rural areas to metropolitan cities, most notably Istanbul, increased 
unprecedentedly, and the remaining vacant spaces in the city started to fall short of 
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accommodating the newcomers (Erman, 2001) (Buğra, 1998). In one of the National Security 
Council declarations in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, the junta government directly 
addressed the squatters as the ‘violators of 12 September orders’ – referring to the martial 
laws pronounced by the junta rule (Ekinci, 1998). Moreover, the state’s policy of overlooking 
the spread of the squatters gradually changed inasmuch as the conventional patronage system 
faded away from the political realm and the urban landscape started to be shaped in line with 
the housing market dynamics (Geniş, 2007). Another reason behind the deadlock of the 
formerly operative urban state of affairs was the fact that neoliberal policies became 
growingly hegemonic in economic and urban restructuring, and they aimed at transforming 
Istanbul into a global city (Ercan, 1996) (Keyder & Öncü, 1993). As a result of executing 
neoliberal policies in this era, the traditional populist policies were replaced by neoliberal 
populism51 and this planted the seeds of an organic crisis between the urban masses and the 
political elite (Öniş, 1997).  
Also, with the coup d’etat in 1980, the previous political structure was shattered by 
the ruthless practices of the junta regime. And a new institutional framework was established 
in a top-down fashion, initiating a disconnection between the state and society that was to last 
until the early 2000s (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan, 2000). In the transition from junta regime 
to civil-democratic regime, the vacuum in civilian politics caused by the three-year junta 
regime was filled by the Motherland Party (ANAP). The experience of ANAP throughout the 
1980s can be summarized, in its general traits, as the process of installation and 
institutionalization of neoliberalism (Zürcher, 1995) . While the welfare state was shrinking, 
political society during the rule of the ANAP with its inter-class and class-cultural alliance, 
and thanks to the successful implementation of neoliberal populism under the charismatic 
aura of Turgut Özal, the leader of ANAP, was still able to maintain its ties with civil society. 
In this context, Özal appeared to be the perfect candidate to enforce free-market rules and 
values while keeping the social and political stability during a period of transition from junta 
                                                 
 51 There are different approaches in describing neoliberal populism. While some scholars asserts for the incompatibility 
between neoliberalism and populism, others belive otherwise. A reason of this discordance is diverse ways of 
conceptualizing the notion of populism. Yet, a depiction of neoliberalism pertinent to the case of Turkey would be as 
follows: “The common denominator of neo-liberal populism is that reforms tend to be initiated in a top-down fashion, often 
launched by surprise and without the participation of organized political forces. Perhaps this is not surprising given that 
reforms involve significant social costs and a disproportionate number of losers are associated with this process. The style of 
policy implementation tends to be autocratic and this autocratic style of policy implementation  tends to undermine 
representative institutions and to personalize politics. Active dialogue and consultation with the key interest groups is by 
definition excluded from  this process. An all-powerful and charismatic leader plays a crucial role in the scenario in terms of 
implementing the reform package and legitimizing it in the eyes of broad segments of the electorate. Hence, neo-liberal 
populism entails the co-existence of liberal economics with illiberal politics or a kind of shallow democracy.” From 
“Economic Legacy of Turgut Özal: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective,” by Z. Öniş, 2004, Middle Eastern 
Studies, p.127. 
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rule to a civilian political regime with broad popular support over a short interval (Öniş, 
2004). “Turgut Özal’s personality was crucial to the key party; indeed, it is doubtful whether 
the coalition would have survived long without him. He had a foot in both camps; he had 
been a successful manager in private industry in the 1970s and was very well connected in 
big business circles, which liked his liberalization of the economy. On the other hand, he was 
known to have connections with the Nakşibendi order of dervishes… Özal was to prove adept 
at playing off the factions within the MP against each other” (Zürcher, 1995).    
Bedrettin Dalan, a member of ANAP who served as the mayor of Istanbul between the 
years 1984-1989, was another salient figure embodying several characteristics of the 
Motherland Party. In his term of office, Dalan’s practices pointed to an ambition to make 
Istanbul a global city by turning the city into a spectacle. During his term in the office, not 
only the unwanted elements were dispelled from the urban centers with the intention of 
gentrifying the city’s visual regime, but it was also aimed at marketing Istanbul as a ‘global 
city’ in the global arena. Apart from spatial segregations, the urban elite could now delve into 
an exclusively visual interaction with the city owing to advanced communication and 
transportation technologies. Moreover, the urban landscape was saturated with spaces such as 
glossy malls, sumptuous residences, and gentrified districts for the pleasures of the upper 
class consumers.  
At this juncture, it would be illustrative to refer to Henri Lefebvre’s discussion of 
everyday life and alienation. Lefebvre notes that capitalism puts the rhythm of everyday life 
in tune with its own rhythm by “thoroughly penetrating the details of daily life” (Lefebvre, 
1988 : 75). The visual regime sits at the center of the alienation process for the everyday has 
an abundance of images and visual elements with the potential of fascinating and seducing 
their spectators. 
Clever images of the everyday are supplied on a day-to-day basis, images that can 
make the ugly beautiful, the empty full, the sordid elevated – and the hideous 
‘fascinating’. These images so skillfully and so persuasively exploit the demands and 
dissatisfactions which every ‘modern’ man carries within himself that is indeed very 
difficult to resist being seduced and fascinated by them, except by becoming rigidly 
puritanical, and, in rejecting ‘sensationalism’, rejecting ‘the present’ and life itself. 
The sudden eruption of sexuality in the domain of image – and more generally in 
leisure – calls for an investigation in its own right (Lefebvre, 1991: 34).52   
 
                                                 
52 Desire and enjoyment, concepts which are widely used in psychoanalytical theory, have a great deal of importance in 
Lefebvre’s analysis of capitalism and ‘the everyday’.  From Lefebvre’s point of view, the explicit display of sexuality 
employs a certain type of enjoyment by transgressing the moral ban which continues to pretend that it is still in effect in the 
aftermath of transgression. However, an important lesson taught by psychoanalytical literature is that jouissance with 
reference to its radically subversive and even destructive dimension cannot be fully administered by any ideology or 
symbolic order. See H. Lefebvre, “Critique of Everyday Life,” 1991 for an insightful analysis of everyday life and sexuality. 
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Such radical transformation of Istanbul was enabled by a suitable legal context. In that 
respect, what distinguished Dalan from his predecessors was the municipality law of 1984 
which concentrated the power in the hands of the local governments and put new financial 
resources at the disposal of metropolitan mayors. With this regulation, local governments 
became more inclined to behave as market facilitators by privatizing municipal services such 
as transportation and housing: 
The implementation of these changes also enabled the then metropolitan mayor 
Bedrettin Dalan […], in the late 1980s to engage in a series of urban renewal projects 
in Istanbul. These projects majestically initiated dramatic transformations in the urban 
landscape of the city, through mega-projects, Hausmannian in nature – such as the 
opening of the Tarlabaşı boulevard, a major axis of the city connecting the Taksim 
Square to the Golden Horn; the demolition of industrial complexes along the shore of 
the Golden Horn, which recast the entire urbanscape of this former industrial and 
working-class district; and the relocation of various industries from within the city to 
its periphery (Bartu Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008: 12-13).  
 
These changes in the municipality law, and the liberalization of the global economy, 
stimulated an environment in which transnational economic forces with know-how and 
capital could play a more active role than before (Geniş, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
liberalization and privatization trends were by no means independent of the state’s social, 
political and economic practices. On the contrary, the neoliberalization process, like other 
transformations of laissez-faire throughout history, required the state’s active participation 
and strong enforcement. Under the new legislative framework, the Mass Housing Fund and 
the Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ), founded in 1984, came to be the two key state-
owned institutions that conducted urban restructuring with the aim of increasing and 
regularizing “the flow of finance to the housing sector and particularly to large housing 
developments catering to middle- and upper-income groups” (Geniş, 2007: 778).  
Parallel to these developments taking place at the national level, Istanbul’s urban 
fabric was going through a radical shift toward a spatial lexicon consisting of social exclusion 
and stigmatization (Keyder, 2005). On the one hand, we have the urban elite believing that 
the purity and essential tissue of Istanbul was defiled by the inflow from rural areas. Gated 
communities appeared to be a solution to this ‘problem’ and they started to pop up in 
different parts of Istanbul as the urban upper-class tended more and more to move to the 
secure and sterilized enclaves around the city (Bali, 2009). Nevertheless, the causal relation 
between the two factors is not a simple one. Research shows that gated towns actually 
engender feelings of insecurity and fear among their inhabitants (Bartu Candan & Kolluoğlu, 
2008). However, these feelings are not the only effects (or motives) of this spatial 
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segregation. The world outside gated towns, that is often associated with poverty, is not only 
criminalized but also ‘abjectified’. In this regard, spatial separation provides the basis for 
constructing a consistently ‘modern’ identity for the dwellers of such fortified enclaves (Bartu 
Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008).    
On the other side of the coin, there was an ongoing story of social exclusion practiced 
upon the urban poor and the working-class impoverished as a result of the de-
industrialization process which is a pillar of neoliberalization. As mentioned before, cities 
with their own political economy and aesthetic tendencies turned into actors relatively 
autonomous from the provisions of nation-states when developmentalism lost its allure to the 
driving economic forces and to the masses after the 1980s. Consequently, cities became 
competing actors in order to attract the volatile and constantly flowing capital at the global 
level, and hence tuned themselves to the interests of the market forces rather than performing 
developmentalist road-maps of the political center (Keyder, Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası, 
1993). As the city economy became more integrated to the global market dynamics, valuable 
lands in Istanbul started to be colonized by these economic forces as well. The city centers 
went through a radical change while long-established and historical neighborhoods were 
evacuated as an indispensable part of the comprehensive gentrification process, and as trade-
centers began rising at the heart of the city. The working class and the urban poor came out to 
be the losers of this neoliberal urban transformation program as inhabitants of many districts 
in the city were often forcibly displaced (Keyder, 2005). The moral base of such regulations 
with devastating effects on the urban masses involved the denigration of the urban poor by 
depicting the squatters, or gecekondu dwellers, as greedy pillagers and defilers of urban 
civility (Bali, 2009) (Buğra, 1998).  
Despite all these setbacks of the neoliberalization of the city, the process was able to 
continue and it is in many ways operative at the present time. In order to understand how this 
trend of transformation has maintained itself considering its devastating effects on the 
population, we should look at some patterns of the early neoliberalization era during the 
1980s and 1990s. It was already mentioned that the market and its norms became ubiquitous 
during the neoliberalization process as we see that the worldwide re-organization of capital 
manifested itself in the radical transformation of global cities. Although the everyday life of 
most social segments deteriorated remarkably, the market managed to inscribe itself to a large 
extent as the new norm and reality (Tuğal, 2009).  One of the factors that made this possible 
was the seductive aspect of the market. Consumerism was instigated through the mass media 
as the society was introduced to personal credit cards, car loans, and other forms of financial 
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credit (Bali, 2009). It is also possible to claim that a new visual and aesthetic vocabulary was 
introduced especially by the image bombardment through media which caused radical effects 
on collective perceptions, norms and values (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan, 2000). Along with 
the seductiveness of the market comes the ‘withering of politics’. As the capital and the 
market rules become the sole determinant in social, political, cultural as well as economic 
aspects of life, labour is excluded from political reckonings and more importantly from the 
decision-making processes (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan, 2000). One key element behind the 
withering of politics was the mass media’s disposition to trivialize “the real political issues 
that underlie the rhythm of daily life or by dramatizing and publicizing the 
trivial/unpolitical/private” (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan, 2000: 503). In the context of 
neoliberalism, the economic provisions of the political left and right converge, and this 
causes a shortage of competing ideas and values and reduces the importance of political 
debates taking place in the public sphere (Öniş, Democracy, 1997).  
The only competition is over “who” will implement the policies. It has thus become 
increasingly difficult to distinguish among the parties, except for their leaders. Turkish 
politics, in reality, has been reduced to administration. The diminished potential of the 
public/political space to influence public policy is, therefore, one aspect of the 
shrinking realm of the political and qualitative sense (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan, 
2000: 495). 
 
At the outset of the 1990s, ANAP started to stumble in the government and lost 
significant popular support in the following elections. This was reflected in the context of 
Istanbul where Bedrettin Dalan lost to Nurettin Sözen, the candidate of the Republican 
People Party (CHP), which had a social-democratic agenda at the time, but had traditionally 
been a bearer of the official ideology. However, Sözen’s agenda did not significantly differ 
from Dalan’s which can be seen as an example of the above-mentioned convergence of 
policies among political parties. Although one can talk about a continuity of the 
neoliberalization process of Istanbul, the 1990s are full of oscillations caused by manifold 
social, political and economic problems such as successive economic depressions, the 
Kurdish question, the political tension between the political-Islamic movement and the 
secularist state (Öktem, 2011). The crisis-prone economy and the politics imbued with 
uncertainties did not let the subsequent mayors catch up with the pace of urban 
transformation in Dalan’s term in the office (Keyder, 2010). 
Against this background, it is important to recognize that the boost in the popularity of 
political-Islam in Turkey occurred in the same period. One plausible analysis is that the urban 
lower class that was excluded from the blessings of Istanbul’s globalization process sought 
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refuge in political-Islam which promised to install a ‘just order’ as a way out of neoliberal 
globalization (Keyder, 2009) (Bora, 2009) (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan, 2000). In Cihan 
Tuğal’s account, the electoral triumph of the Welfare Party in 1994 can be interpreted as a 
response to the organic crisis, the disintegration between the state and the civil society, 
deepening throughout the 1980s and 1990s. From this perspective, Islamic mobilization 
appears to be formulated as the “reconstitution of hegemony” as an attempt to link society 
and the state. To Tuğal, the process of hegemony reconstitution includes “the organization of 
consent for domination and inequality through a specific articulation of everyday life, space, 
and the economy with certain patterns of authority under a certain leadership which forges 
unity out of disparity” (Tuğal, 2009: 24).  
 
 
 The Rise and Fall of Political-Islam in the 1990s  
 
The period in which the Islamist Welfare Party (RP) acquired the municipality of 
Istanbul, along with that of Ankara, was rather full of fluctuations, ambivalences and 
inconsistencies. In 1994, the Islamist party came out victorious from the local elections by 
gaining two out of the three metropolises, excluding Izmir. This was a great shock to almost 
everyone but particularly the secularist segments of the population and the political power-
holders in the existing status-quo were presumably bewildered most. According to many 
scholars, the anti-globalization, -Western, -capitalist discourse of the Islamists attracted the 
marginalized city population whose social and economic position had deteriorated due to the 
restructuring of urban space along the tenets of neoliberalism and globalization (Keyder, 
2005) (Tuğal, 2002). On the other hand, a belligerent tone was quite palpable in the RP’s 
rhetoric. The discourse of (re-)conquest in the Islamist circles was one of the most attention-
grabbing (Bora, 2009). According to this vision of conquest, Istanbul as the grand capital of 
the Ottoman past should be reconstituted by cleansing it from degenerated and alien, in other 
words Western, elements. Istanbul came to occupy a key role in the Islamist Party’s strategies 
to consolidate its political and discursive power hinging on two pillars. First, as one can grasp 
without difficulty, Istanbul was the symbol of Ottoman hegemony that had lasted for more 
than four centuries. On the other hand, Islamist discourse rather interestingly addressed itself 
to the multicultural feature of the city. However, the twist here was the interpretation that it 
was the Ottoman hegemony that had fostered and maintained cultural diversity and social 
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harmony (Bora, 2009).  
At the macro level, the type of populism that Islamists implemented was another 
distinctive feature. Most political parties in Turkey engaged in populism of rulers and states 
in which patronage relations take place on the assumption that the interests of classless 
masses are one and the same with those of the state (Tuğal, 2002). Neoliberal populism draws 
its strength from its ability to recruit disadvantageous groups’ support for its agenda without 
envisaging economic improvement for them (Filc, 2011). The Islamist populism, on the other 
hand, was also profoundly different from this type of populism. Islamist populism in the 
1990s, unlike other modes of populisms, preferred “consistent redistribution of resources 
from dominant groups to subordinate groups. Moreover, during the coalition government led 
by the Welfare Party, some sectors of the working class received wage rises which can be 
considered a rare event in the post-1980 period in Turkey” (Tuğal, 2002 : 95).  
However, if we are to conceive of the experience of the Welfare Party as an attempt of 
reconstitution of hegemony, we should also bear in mind that the notion of hegemony is an 
incomplete process by definition (Tuğal, 2009). Along with several achievements, it was also 
possible to observe certain weaknesses and setbacks in the case of the Welfare Party. For 
instance, it would be misleading to assume that the Welfare Party was wholly aloof from the 
rules of the market despite this popular discourse and the populist practices which were 
radically distinct from those of other political parties. After coming to the offices of 
municipality, Islamists had to take the economic principles into consideration in governing 
cities (Bora, 2009). It is also crucial to underline that the political-Islamist movement in the 
1990s was far from being homogeneous in terms of class affiliations, discursive positions and 
economic vision. Cihan Tuğal prefers to divide the Islamic movement of that time with 
regard to different stances toward capitalism roughly into three categories: “proponents of a 
moral capitalism,” proponents of an alternative capitalism,” and “those who morally oppose 
capitalism” (Tuğal, 2002: 98). Tuğal conceptualizes the Islamist promise of the ‘just order’ as 
a floating signifier which is to be activated in the negotiations between the ‘real’ (institutions, 
relations of production and domination) and the “imaginary” (the signification of the real in 
the realm of language and symbols) (Tuğal, 2002).53 In this mise-en-scene, moral anti-
capitalists came to be the most disadvantageous due to the Islamic real; that is “intensifying 
unequal secular relations between believers” (Tuğal, 2002: 106).           
                                                 
53 In his analysis, Tuğal borrows the terms,  the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’ not directlyfrom Jacques Lacan but from  
Cornelius Castoriadis whose works are deeply inspired by Lacanian conceptualizations. See C. Castoriadis, “The Imaginary 
Institution of Society,” 1998 for a more detailed description of these concepts.   
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Another problem for the failure of the RP experience was the fact that political-Islam 
was becoming an ever stronger political alternative that gave way to paranoia and a sense of 
insecurity to the secularist segments of the society, but especially among the ruling political 
elite. The tension reached its peak when the political-Islamic party, Welfare Party succeeded 
to form a coalition government with a center-right party, the Truepath Party (DYP) in 1996, 
and the slippery ground upon which the civil and the political societies continued their 
relationship, although with great difficulty, fell into pieces after a ‘post-modern’ military coup 
in 1997 (Castoriadis, 1998). In February 28, the military declared an ultimatum against the 
rising menace of irtica54 and forced the government, in which the Welfare Party (RP) was the 
big shareholder, to cosign it. In the aftermath, a comprehensive witch-hunt was initiated 
targeting the members of political-Islam not only in the political sphere but in everyday life. 
Meanwhile, political Islam started to be designated as a rising threat to the perpetuity 
of Turkey’s secular regime by the state. There had already been a tension escalating between 
the Welfare Party and the secularist state institutions, most prominently the army and the 
jurisdiction. However, with the ‘post-modern’ military intervention in 28 February 1997, the 
mutual distrust reached its acme:  
 
The military intervention of 28 February, 1997, restricted itself to giving 
“recommendations” to the coalition government instead of disbanding the parliament 
as the military did in 1980. It asked the government to increase obligatory secular 
education from five to eight years, restrict Kur’an schools and these policies without 
estranging its base. The government resigned. The impact of the military intervention 
was sustained by acts such as the closing down of the RP (January 1998) and the 
banning of its leader, Erbakan, from politics. The Virtue Party (FP), which replaced 
RP, toned down its criticism of the establishment but also ventured to elect a veiled 
woman to the parliament. The ideologues of the FP had started to reframe the veiling 
issue as a matter of democracy and human rights, which led them to expect European 
Union (EU) to intervene on their behalf. The veiled Member of Parliament (MP), 
Merve Kavakçı, had to leave the parliament before she could be sworn in, under the 
pressure of nationalist and center leftist parties. This was one of the incidents that led 
to the closing of the FP. Center right and center left, the old foes were united in their 
support for the military intervention and its ongoing repercussions. The differences 
within (hegemonic) civil and political society were suspended to fight 
counterhegemony. After this counterattack by the system, the Islamist party plunged 
into a deep crisis. As several ways of challenging hegemony failed, a sizable part of 
the Islamist leadership opted for joining the elite (Tuğal, 2009: 46).   
 
As a result of this military intervention, the Islamic endeavor to re-connect the civil 
                                                 
54 Although the literal translation of irtica would be reacion, this is far from conveying the meaning of the word in social 
perception. The word irticai tehlike (reactionary danger) had often used in the resolutions of the National Security Council in 
order to address the waxing Islamists movement as an approaching menace to the continuity of the secular regime in Turkey.  
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society with the political society came to a halt. The defiant position of the political class in 
order to protect its own interests became a common situation throughout the 1990s (Cizre-
Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan, 2000). This position of the state created a gulf between the political 
sphere and the civil society with respect to the fact that several segments of the latter started 
to be construed as a menace to the survival of the dominant political and ideological regime 
by the former. 
When the coalition government led by the Islamists could not properly function under 
the shadow of the military’s suffocating presence anymore, general elections were held in 
which a center-left party with Kemalist tendencies, the Democratic Leftist Party (DSP) under 
the leadership of Bulent Ecevit and the ultra-nationalists, the Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP) increased their votes dramatically in comparison to the previous elections. In addition 
to these two, ANAP, with its constantly diminishing popular support after the death of Özal 
in1993, became the small partner in the new coalition government which continued to govern 
until the general elections in 2002. During the reign of the three-party coalition, numerous 
crises emerged, most of which derived from the disharmony among the ruling parties. Yet, the 
major blow to this government was the great economic depression in 2001.The middle class 
was severely traumatized by the dramatically increasing job cuts as a result of economic 
downsizing (Bora, 2011). Political society’s reliability which had already been waning over 
the 1990s, fully evaporated in the eyes of the people with the devastating influence of the 
economic breakdown. Hence, in a nutshell, the 1990s up until 2001 can be summarized as a 
period in which the neoliberal transformation of Istanbul at the local level and of Turkey at 
the national level, for the most part, continued but also stumbled from time to time by the 
overbearing and persistent social, political and economic instabilities, crises, and 
discontinuities. 
 
 
The Repressed Returns For Good: The AKP Hegemony  
 
In the general elections following the economic crisis, all incumbent political parties 
forming the previous government were left out of the parliament for they were not able to 
pass the ten-percent threshold. Only two parties were able to overcome the quota restriction 
and enter the parliament: the Justice and Development Party (AKP), formed by the pro-
democratic and increasingly neoliberal youth of the Welfare Party, and the Republican People 
Party (CHP), the advocate of the Kemalist/secularist bureaucracy-dominated status quo. The 
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AKP was the winner of the elections with a wide margin, having attracted the votes of those 
who were most severely affected from the economic crisis in 2001 (Ataay & Kalfa, 2009). 
Moreover, the party held the absolute majority in the parliament with unrivaled power of 
legislation and constitution amendment. Nevertheless, the army and the bureaucracy were 
still sitting at the heart of the status quo and had no intention to share their power with this 
newcomer. Besides, the memory of the former Islamist parties that had been closed twice by 
the high-court was still fresh in the minds of the AKP members. Against this background, the 
AKP invested a substantive part of its discursive capacity in the ongoing process of European 
Union accession, and promised to speed up the democratization process. The conservative 
vein was still there but it was now tamed and ‘moderated’ with the implementation of free-
market rules and with the party’s announced commitment to make Turkey an EU member by 
conforming to the Copenhagen Criteria (Tuğal, 2009) (Öniş & Keyman, 2007).  
Different from its predecessor, the Justice and Development Party convincingly 
presented itself as an offspring of an “alternative modernity” without denying its Islamic 
roots (Tuğal, 2009) (Keyman & Koyuncu, 2005). Nonetheless, the key element in the AKP’s 
long-running political success, which had been absent in the Welfare Party experience, was 
its ability to forge “cross-class electoral alliances incorporating into its orbit both winners and 
losers from the neo-liberal globalization process” (Öniş & Keyman, 2007: 179). A concrete 
example of this strategy was establishing a delicate balance between the two umbrella 
organizations dominant in the Turkish business sector: TUSIAD, the representative of big 
corporations, and MUSIAD, composed of small and medium sized enterprises mostly located 
in Anatolian cities with conservative and Islamic tendencies. These two business associations 
functioned as the pro-EU coalition supporting the AKP government in its first five-year rule 
(Öniş & Keyman, 2007).   
The peculiarity of the AKP’s strategy of coaxing both the losers and the winners of 
neoliberalism into compliance with its policies was also observable in the local-urban 
contexts. Indeed, the reorganization of everyday life through spatial practices at the micro 
level has been a crucial strategy in the constitution of the new hegemony of the AKP (Tuğal, 
2009). The AKP turned its back to militant metaphors widely used by the Welfare Party such 
as second conquest. Along with this disposition, the AKP’s program of urban transformation 
envisioned partial de-Islamization of space: “As the business wing of the Islamist movement 
now dominated the party, the emphasis further shifted to creating to proper urban 
infrastructure and culture that would attract investment. The overall appearance of cities was 
secularized, but cities also became more Islamic through the integration of Islamic 
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businesses, consumers, and life-styles” (Tuğal, 2009: 55). 
Moderation of the Islamic features on the plane of high-politics and in the 
arrangements of everyday life brought about a discursive shift in the new representative of 
the Islamic movement. As the party dropped the former confrontational rhetoric employed by 
its predecessor, the AKP was able to present itself as a post-ideological organization and 
mindset by claiming that it allegedly ‘embraces everyone’. As the urban transformation 
reached an unprecedented pace, the party was now able to emphasize the notion of services 
(icraat). In Prime Minister Erdoğan’s own words: “We are not doing ideological politics, but 
politics of service.”55 Those who opposed or criticized those services were denounced as 
‘ideological’ elements trying to prevent the prospering of the country and improvement of the 
citizens’ life quality. At this point, everyday life emerges as a realm characterized and praised 
as extra-ideological, which should also be put under scrutiny.  Problematizing the notion of 
everyday life particularly matters in a context where the contemporary right-wing political 
discourse claims to be, rather convincingly, ‘life itself’ (Bora, 2012: 18).  
 After the overall economic collapse in 2001, the Turkish domestic economy went into 
a growing trend which coincided with the AKP’s electoral victory in 2002. This economic 
growth prompted the government to encourage the construction sector towards sectoral 
expansion (Balaban, 2011: 24). In 2004 and 2005, the AKP government promulgated new 
municipality laws that reinforced the already powerful office of the mayor. These new laws 
entailed: “broadening the physical space under the control and jurisdiction of the greater 
municipality; increasing its power and authority in development (imar), control and 
coordination of district municipalities; making it easier for greater municipalities to establish, 
and/or create partnerships and collaborate with private companies; defining new 
responsibilities of the municipality in dealing with ‘natural disasters’; and outlining the first 
legal framework for ‘urban transformation,’ by giving municipalities the authority to 
designate, plan and implement ‘urban transformation’ areas and project” (Bartu Candan & 
Kolluoğlu, 2008: 13).  
 AKP’s municipality reforms also included revitalizing the Mass Housing 
Administration (MHA) directly tied to the Prime Ministry. With a number of legal 
regulations, MHA is now furnished with vast powers and even formulated as the ultimate 
administrative body in charge of the housing and land management. Nevertheless, it would be 
                                                 
55 Çetik, A & Sert, C. (2009, March 4). Başbakan Erdoğan: İdeoloji değil, hizmet siyaseti yapıyoruz. Milliyet. Retrieved July 
03, 2012, from 
http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/basbakan-erdogan---ideoloji-degil--hizmet-siyaseti-yapiyoruz-
/siyaset/siyasetdetay/04.03.2009/1067002/default.htm 
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erroneous to assume that MHA now endowed with such extensive legislative and 
administrative power tends to crush the private construction companies. Conversely, MHA 
works both as a facilitator for private companies to take part in public contract for housing 
projects and as a profit-oriented company by venturing to urban transformation projects under 
the name of ‘fund raising’ (Balaban, 2011) (Bartu Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008).  
“Gecekondu Trasformation Projects” is another pillar of the AKP’s program of urban 
restructuring. These projects include “the demolition of gecekondu neighborhoods and 
dis/replacement of the residents to public housing projects” (Bartu Candan & Kolluoğlu, 
2008: 15). Also, several districts were evicted and demolished under the pretext of ‘renewal’, 
‘rehabilitation’, and ‘preservation’ of the “historical and cultural heritage” of Istanbul, 
enabled by the Law no. 5366 (Bartu Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008: 15). To put it more simply, 
the urban fabric has in fact been grievously destroyed, ironically with the intent of preserving 
and ‘re’-creating a nostalgic and gentrified model of the city’s cultural and historical heritage. 
This process often ends up in a class-based spatial re-arrangement by passing the renovated 
neighborhoods from its former inhabitants into the hands of middle and upper classes 
(Gülhan, 2011).  
Towards the end of its first electoral term, the AKP started to intensify the nationalist 
flavor in its rhetoric in order to attract further the votes of ethnic Turks (Cizre, 2008) (Duran, 
2008). Consequently, the AKP has consolidated its political power by enhancing its votes 
dramatically in each election.56 In the meantime, the government has gradually undermined 
the strong positions of the secularist elite, the Turkish Armed Forces and the dominant 
Kemalist presence within the judicial organ, and wiped out the etatist corpses from the state 
in due course. As the party started to become the sole political power holder, the nationalist 
tone and belligerent tendencies in the government’s and the Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
rhetoric have significantly increased. Hereupon, comprehensive legal (and political) 
campaigns have been launched against various groups such as the former secularist elite, the 
Kurdish movement, and a wide spectrum of leftist groups that are claimed to be threats to the 
civil government.  
Here, a clarification should be made. Nationalism is not simply a strategic concern to 
be pragmatically resorted to in times of need for the AKP; it is also an organic feature of the 
party (Tuğal, 2009) (Coşar, 2011). Contrary to the paranoid ideas and feelings widespread 
among far-right Turkish nationalists, a self-confident stance is at stake in the AKP’s 
                                                 
56 The AKP again increased its popular support and gained almost %50 of the overall votes in the last general elections held 
in 2011.  
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formulation of Turkishness by synchronizing the nationalist narratives with the Islamist 
understanding of the Ottoman past (Bora, 2011).  
 
The party’s resort to nationalist sentiments marks the indispensability of nationalism 
for its political identity. It speaks of the historical “Turkish nation, taking the three 
continents under its wings, and embracing numerous tribes and countries with loving 
care”; the “metaphysical foundation, universal ideal” of the Turkish nation; and the 
civilizational (meaning that the “Ottoman civilization that has far surpassed the West 
in historical development”) assets of the Turks, including “love, lore, and insight 
[irfan]” (Erdoğan 2002a, 2007; my translation). Likewise, the emphasis on “one 
nation, one flag, one state… the shared values and ideals as a means for strengthening 
our unity” and on the “impossibility of thinking small for the Turk… they have to 
think big” gives clues about the mode of nationalism that the party attempts to 
appropriate (Erdoğan 2007; my translation). Direct and indirect references to 
tolerance and the will to live together, despite differences, as organic features of 
Turkishness attest that merging conservative nationalism with the irresistible tide of 
liberalism (irresistible for the party’s survival) results in banal nationalism, as 
conceptualized by Michael Billig (Coşar, 2011: 182).   
 
 As Michael Billig contends, “banal nationalism” is very much about daily practices 
epitomized in “flagged” streets, edifices, and other parts of everyday spatiality (Billig, 1995). 
The rising banal nationalism palpable in the Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speeches is reflected 
on everyday life through spatial regulation. As Erdoğan himself mentions the “impossibility 
of thinking small for the Turk,” the newly rising constructions meet this aspect of ‘thinking 
big’. Although notions such as the ‘unity of the state’, or ‘nation’ have long been of great 
importance for the AKP, it is possible to argue that the main emphasis has shifted from a 
pragmatist self-restraining attitude concerning a delicate inter-class balance to a more 
unreserved position of making a series of aggressive and scandalous statements with 
impunity (Tuğal, 2009: 154). In this regard, the claim that AKP, during the first years in 
office, dropped grandiose visions inherited by the Virtue Party seems to lose its currency by 
looking at the contemporary situation. The professional attitude and pragmatic position 
espoused by the discourse of “doability” has been replaced by nationalist/atavistic ‘dreams’ 
of grandeur.  
According to Cihan Tuğal, the concept of hegemony comprises the aspect of daily 
practices and spatiality as well as more noble dimensions such as high politics or macro 
economy. One of Tuğal’s insightful observations regarding the two-decade experience of 
political-Islam in Turkey is that the AKP has been incredibly successful in instituting and 
maintaining its hegemony through spatial arrangements regulating the day-to-day activities, 
rituals, and visual experiences of the society (Tuğal, 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising to 
39 
 
witness that the above mentioned shift in the party’s political rhetoric is reflected on social 
spatiality, most prominently on the urban landscape. Since Istanbul has been at the focus of 
the Islamist ‘imaginary’ of its Ottoman past, the city has been thoroughly subjected to the 
AKP’s program of hegemony constitution through spatial arrangements. The growing 
proportions in the newly rising structures propose a parallel between the growing actual sizes 
of buildings and the prospering country and nation (Penpecioğlu, 2011). By the same token, 
politics in Turkey has been immersed, to a large extent, into the paradigm of ‘the hollowing 
out of politics’ intertwined with neoliberal/nationalist architectural utopias, like Kanal 
Istanbul, insofar as the fascinating magnitudes of modern-day mega-constructions and 
projects override the political economic queries: What is the accurate cost of such projects? 
With which financial sources will these projects be realized? In what precise ways and to 
what extent does the government foresee creating employment during and in the aftermath of 
these projects’ actualization? Nevertheless, an organic crisis does not accompany this anti-
politicization trend as in the 1990s (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu & Yeldan, 2000).  
Apart from the West-East axis, the all-embracing urban transformation goes hand in 
hand with the absorption of capitalism. The AKP’s real achievement is its ability to convince 
people that they are equal with the rulers and an indispensable part of the success story of 
national development in a neoliberal context where there are clearly-defined winners and 
losers. During the AKP rule, capitalism is naturalized and inscribed as an indispensable 
dimension of daily activities. In other words, the AKP hegemony has been successful in 
creating and reproducing a subjectivity that is incapable of thinking any beyond of capitalism. 
In his field study, Cihan Tuğal reports of his interviews with the construction workers who 
‘desire’ to see a stable economy. According to Tuğal, this is the conservative government’s 
doing since the economy was dereified before the 2001 crisis. It is as if, in the context of 
well-functioning conservative political hegemony, the workers relinquish their own desires 
and enjoyment in exchange for those of the market. Here, religious rhetoric is also put at the 
disposal of capitalist relations as in the case of ‘fate’ [nasip] (Tuğal, 2009).  
All sorts of antagonisms are construed as obstacles against national prosperity. This 
can be most lucidly witnessed in the aspiration of one of Tuğal’s interviewees for Saudi 
Arabia, since it is considered the ideally functioning Islamic regime in which there is no 
union and no right to strike but everyone has full insurance (Tuğal, 2009). In other words, 
politicization is portrayed as responsible for all social unrest and any malfunction of the 
‘welfare system’. As discussed earlier, in the context where the hegemonic political power 
presents itself as extra-ideological – or ‘non-ideological’ – questioning the quality and 
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politics of the party’s practices and services can easily be labeled as ‘ideological’ by the party 
members.57 In this respect, the example of Saudi Arabia tells us something crucial about the 
political fantasies operative under the AKP hegemony. Politics are to be excluded from the 
political realm as the ultimate aim of politics should be defined as ‘serving the people’ 
regardless of questions such as: What does ‘serving the people’ mean? How to serve the 
‘people’? Who are the ‘people’, and who are not? Such queries are silenced or rebuked as 
‘killjoys’ who do not want the ‘people’ to have a better life due to their ‘ideological’ thinking. 
In this symbolic matrix where neoliberalism sets norms of sterility, security, morals, 
aesthetics, and politics, it becomes even more difficult to conduct effective opposition against 
the ‘successful’ implementers of neoliberalism. Here, one should also consider the fact that 
spatial regulations in line with neoliberal precepts lead to mass scale displacements and 
violations of the housing rights of disadvantageous groups. In its claim of serving for the 
‘people’, it becomes questionable whether the political authority counts those who suffer 
from gentrification projects as a part of the ‘people. A more puzzling question regarding this 
case would be how the AKP, which that has been the most ardent and reckless practitioner of 
gentrification projects, manages to solve the ‘organic crisis’ caused by the exclusionary 
practices of neoliberalization.   
Abjection, which is a strategy effectively deployed by the political authority, may be 
counted as one possible answer to this question. Groups of scapegoats, for example Jews and 
atheists58, who were quite popular in Islamic conspiracy narratives especially in the 1990s, 
are still operative in hegemonic ‘fantasies’ (Tuğal, 2009). By means of such fantasies, the 
inherent limitations and contradictions of the hegemonic order are externalized, and a well-
functioning and coherent system becomes ‘imaginable’ and possible in the absence of those 
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externalized obstructions. To put it more accurately, it is believed that the system would work 
smoothly if there were no opposition which supposedly does not cease to create obstacles 
against the ‘course of action’ (Zizek, 2002). The AKP’s discourse concerning the activities of 
construction and architecture owes greatly to this fundamental fantasy. Not only the shanty 
towns eyed by the state institutions conducting urban transformation are discredited for being 
nests for ‘terrorists’ but also the resistance movements against neoliberal urban 
transformation projects are often assimilated in a ‘blame game’ where they are denounced as 
part of the conspiracies hampering the country’s development.59 ‘If nobody were on the way, 
the AKP would have solved all the problems of Turkey’60 
Another distinguishing characteristics of the AKP as a neoliberal party is its 
‘neoliberal populism’ – or ‘neo-populism’. Although the notion of populism became 
outmoded in the 1980s as neoliberalism spread across the world as the prevailing economic 
system, in the 1990s it returned in the forms of “radical right populism in western Europe, 
nationalist populism in eastern Europe and the combination of a populist political style with a 
neo-liberal project, which most of the relevant literature considers as characteristic of Latin 
America” (Filc, 2011: 235). After the example of Turgut Özal, the current Prime Minister 
Erdoğan might be considered another case of a ‘neo-populist’ leader embodying exclusionary 
and inclusionary features. On the one hand, lower classes are excluded and stigmatized by the 
neoliberalization program. On the other hand, the extensive use of populist rhetoric appeals to 
subordinate classes’ populist identity through which they have been constituted as subjects in 
the political matrix: populus or the ‘people’. At the symbolic level, neoliberal populism tends 
to favor a more exclusionary signification of the ‘people’ as a cultural or ethnic totality.  
A further salient feature of this kind of populism is that it lays its foundation on the 
absence of inclusive mechanisms which were present in the pre-neoliberal era (Filc, 2011). 
As Keynesian principles do not count anymore, it becomes impossible for any government to 
pursue populist economic policies at the expense of fiscal discipline. Accordingly, populism 
in this kind of setting cannot operate upon the notion of promise in the classical sense. In one 
of his books, Jacques Ranciere writes about the presidential debate which took place between 
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François Mitterand and Jacques Chirac: the former is “the man of the promise never kept” 
whereas the latter is “the man of dynamism who always move forward” (Ranciere, 2007: 8). 
The paradigm of neoliberal populism seems to coincide with the latter in which politics 
becomes an activity exercised in the present as the future is no more than an extension of the 
present. According to Ranciere, contemporary politics has freed itself from the illusionary 
self-representation of the ‘promise of happiness’ (Ranciere, 2007).  
In this light, Kanal Istanbul may appear to be at odds with this formula of politics 
inasmuch as it is, at face value, a prodigious promise: a radical change in the geography, 
building two satellite cities out of nothing, creating an island in the shape of Turkish flag… 
Although this holds true to some extent, it should also be taken into account that Kanal 
Istanbul has never been treated as a political promise in its conventional sense. The whole 
issue of the crazy project was more like a political spectacle magnetizing a collective 
enjoyment than being about convincing people regarding the project’s possibility or 
feasibility. On the other hand, this situation does not fit Ranciere’s description of the newly 
emerging politics due to the project’s highly ostensible utopist features: national 
development/prosperity and ‘catching up with the West’. At this juncture, one should recall 
that the AKP cannot simply be understood as an outcome of the neoliberalization process for 
the last four decades. The party should also be regarded as a product of the discourse that had 
been prevalent since the early stages of Turkish republic. As we will see in the next chapter, 
the AKP’s spatial policies and discourses concerning this subject is marked by a visible 
similarity to the modernization and the nation-building project of the early republic.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
NARRATIVES ON ARCHITECTURE AND CONSTRUCTION: THE 
LEGACY OF THE MODERNIST-DEVELOPMENTALIST DISCOURSE 
OF THE EARLY REPUBLICAN ERA 
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In this chapter, two hegemonic configurations in different historical moments of modern 
Turkey will be compared regarding the operative narratives revolving around the idea of 
architecture and construction. The first one is the early Republican era in which it is possible 
to witness a comprehensive architectural and spatial reconstruction within the context of a 
modern program of nation- building. After the Turkish Republic was founded, and replaced 
the centuries old Ottoman Empire, the republican political elite ventured on a set of reforms 
with the aim of creating a new modern society. While carrying out reforms ranging from 
constituting new institutions to meticulously regulating the population’s daily practices, the 
republican state spent extensive effort in constructing new public spaces with the intention of 
creating modern citizens. This was an extremely pedagogical program executed in a top-
down fashion by excluding any critical contribution or public discussion. Accordingly, 
architecture came to be a highly regarded discipline, and the figure of the architect appeared 
as a pedagogical figure endowed with the skills to create modern spaces that would 
supposedly lead to the emergence of a modern Turkish society composed of proper citizens 
(Bozdoğan, 2001).  
Our other case will deal with the last ten years of Turkey during which the country has 
undergone a radical change in a direction different from the roadmap of the early republican 
program. It has already been stated that the political rhetoric of the ruling party, the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP), has gone through a discernible change as the power relations 
in the country went in the party’s favor. It seems that the increasing national tone in the 
statements of the cabinet members, especially of Prime Minister Erdoğan manifests itself in 
the aesthetic and discursive expressions of the new mega-constructions. As the country’s 
economy can be considered relatively stable over the last ten years, especially in a context 
where the United States and all the Euro-zone are in deep economic deadlocks, the optimistic 
view paves the way to an arrogant and ‘sanctimonious’ nationalist discourse: ‘We are now 
catching up with the West’, ‘Turkey is finally breaking free from its rusty shackles,” “we are 
now worthy of our great Ottoman ancestors’… At the same time, the neoliberal tenets of 
urbanization are still at work but now operating in co-operation with a playful form of 
national pride. Yet, before delving into a full-fledged discussion of these two particular cases, 
it would be fruitful to clarify some concepts and draw the theoretical framework of the 
relation between ideology/political hegemony and spatial subjectivities.  
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The Nation Building Project in the Early Republican Era 
 
The act of “building” has been functioning as a metaphor associated with the act of 
creating a nation. This metaphor aptly fits into the Kemalist nation-building project in early 
republican Turkey. After the foundation of the republic, Mustafa Kemal, the still-
iconographic figure of Turkish politics, and the other republican leaders launched a far-
reaching project of modernization and secularization. High modernism was used extensively 
as the dominant architectural style in their endeavors to change the daily habits of the 
population through creating modern spaces (Bozdoğan, 2001).  
 
The architectural culture of the early Turkish republic amply illustrates how high 
modernism as an ideology appealed particularly to “planners, engineers, architects, 
scientists and technicians” who “wanted to use state power to bring about huge, 
utopian changes in people’s work habits, living patterns, moral conduct and 
worldview. Modern architecture was imported as both a visible symbol and an 
effective instrument of this radical program to create a thoroughly Westernized, 
modern, and secular new nation dissociated from the country’s own Ottoman and 
Islamic past. In this respect, architecture in early republican Turkey can be looked at 
as a literally “concrete” manifestation of the high modernist vision (Bozdoğan, 2001: 
6). 
 
 From the Ottoman elite in the nineteenth century to the political cadres of the 
republic, successive figures of modernization tirelessly aimed to ‘catch up’ with the 
‘contemporary civilization’ – that is the West. Kemalist republican discourse differentiated 
itself from earlier Westernization projects with the claim of ‘starting off with a clean slate’. 
Since this was one of the bases of legitimacy for the newly founded republic, the Modern 
Movement61 appears as the architectural form to symbolize modernization and 
Westernization (Bozdoğan, 2001). Apart from being an aesthetic choice, one of the reasons 
why modern architecture was designated for the nation-building project in the early republic 
was the “simplicity and austerity of modern forms… with their connotations of rationality 
and economy of means” (Bozdoğan, 2001: 61). After decades of war and an incessant series 
                                                 
61 Modern Movement is an aesthetic canon in the twentieth century architecture which is characterized by privilaging 
revolutionary ambitions, the scientific doctrine, and universal validity. “Use of reinforced concrete, steel, and glass, the 
primacy of cubic forms, geometric shapes, and Cartesian grids, and above all the absence of decorationi stylistic motifs, 
traditional roofs, and ornamental details have been its defining features in twentieth century aesthetic consciousness.” Note. 
From “Modernism and Nation Building. Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic,” by S. Bozdoğan, 2001, p.4. 
Copyright 2001 by S. Bozdoğan. Reprinted with permission. 
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of demographic and economic devastations, modern forms of architecture would appear as an 
appealing option (Bozdoğan, 2001). Since the Kemalist modernization project and the ‘New 
Architecture’ embraced a progressive understanding of historicism, Istanbul as the imperial 
capital of the Ottoman State became of secondary importance. Ankara, the new capital of the 
Turkish Republic, was now at the focus of the nation-building project and it was designated 
as the model-city for the country to made ‘out of nothing’ (Türkoğlu Önge, 2007).   
Ironically, it was the “dirt and dust” of old Istanbul against which the newness and 
cleanliness of Ankara were celebrated as a republican icon. The “old versus new” 
construct was employed extensively in visual and literary representations of Ankara. 
Istanbul, the city that had been the seat of imperial power and religious authority for 
five centuries, was delegated to serve as Ankara’s “other” in every respect. Not only in 
architectural and urban terms but also in terms of less visible qualities, “the purity, 
moral superiority, and idealism” of the new capital were contrasted with “the imperial 
and dynastic traditions, the cosmopolitan contamination and decadence” of Istanbul 
(Bozdoğan, 2001: 67).  
 
 The doctrine of the ‘architecture of revolution’ [inkilap mimarisi] as a national 
roadmap to architectural reconstruction was based on the universal pillars of modern 
architecture – that is predominantly scientific, functional, rational, anti-ornamental. The 
“architecture of revolution,” which was also called the New Architecture, resorted to the 
notions of rationality, utility and to the idea of progressive historicism so as to render itself as 
“historically necessary” (Bozdoğan, 2001: 110). The rationality and utility of this 
architectural doctrine became functional instruments as the republican elite pedagogically 
encouraged people “to live economically, to combat waste, and to use national products” 
(Bozdoğan, 2001: 137). In its claim of surpassing ideology – in the narrow sense of the 
concept – in architecture by choosing rationality and functionality over aesthetic style and 
monumentality, the New Architecture was subjected to another ideology, the ‘ideology of the 
plan’ (Tafuri, 1996). The ideology of plan was highly ostensible in the deliberate organization 
of urban public spaces that implied the existence of an omnipotent political vision making 
deliberate architectural and urban planning by exercising cold abstractions on space (Sargın, 
2002) (Batuman, 2002).  
   In this setting, professions that were considered to embody scientific discourse 
became valuable professionals such as the bureaucratic intelligentsia, technicians, engineers, 
planners and architects while traditional techniques of construction started to be outmoded. 
The figure of the architect gained the most remarkable prominence since they were seen as 
both “technical experts thinking economically and rationally” and as “artists giving shape to a 
new nation” (Bozdoğan, 2001: 156). The merit of combining those two properties palpably 
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increased the scope of the architect’s activities: “The architect was no longer an artist or 
craftsman but an expert with an unprecedentedly broad range of involvement and 
responsibilities in everything from sociological and economic matters to the design of 
domestic furniture” (Bozdoğan, 2001). In line with this mindset, architecture came to occupy 
a pivotal role in city planning (Tekeli, 1984). While negating the stylistic ornamentation 
prevalent in Ottoman revivalism (otherwise known as the First National Architectural 
Movement) for being anachronistic, architects of the New Architecture were to maintain a 
certain extent of artistic creativity in contrast to engineering as a competing profession 
(Batur, 1984) (Bozdoğan, 2001). In this regard, there always remained a margin of ambiguity 
in the interplay between aesthetics and functionalist attitudes (Bozdoğan, 2001). 
 This kind of praiseful depiction of the architect went hand in hand with the denotation 
of modern architecture as an instrument in mankind’s struggle against nature. In one of his 
speeches, Mustafa Kemal contended: “Civilization is a sublime force that pierces mountains, 
crosses the skies, enlightens and explores everything from the smallest particle of dust to the 
stars.”62 In this phrase, the word civilization, to which a supernatural power is figuratively 
attributed, refers to modern science in general but it also implies the technical achievements 
of engineering and modern architecture, hence the example of ‘piercing mountains’. 
However, it is not a matter of choice deriving from civilization’s solemnity but of necessity to 
follow this ‘sublime force’, materialized in the West’s material and social achievements 
(Bozdoğan, 2001). So, Mustafa Kemal’s deference towards civilization can also be 
formulated as a fascination with human beings’ gradually increasing control over nature and 
its sublime, untamed forces.63 Architecture is endowed with great importance inasmuch as the 
                                                 
62 Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri 2, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1959,  p.212. 
 
63 A topic somewhat related to the emergence of a new national monumentality within context of late capitalism would be a 
reformulation of the concept of the sublime regarding this subject-matter at hand. The notion of the sublime is exhaustively 
dealt by 18th century philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Edmund Burke and Friedrich Hegel. In its simplest terms, the 
sublime stands for an aesthetic register that exceeds the capacity of reason and cognitive faculties, and which generates a 
sense of grandeur and deference in the perception of earthbound subjects. This otherworldly and quasi-religious formulation 
of the sublime was mostly used in evaluating the aesthetic value of works of art where reason and intellectuality fails to 
function properly, and widely respected by the 18th century Romantic figures  In the realm of architecture, we come across 
the concept in the notion of ‘industrially sublime’ most properly epitomized by the Chrystal Palace. In the modern-day, this 
concept has become popular against the backdrop of postmodern capitalism. This time, however, the concept of the sublime 
is understood to be sullied by the material conditions of contemporary everyday life (technology, dominant visual regimes, 
palpable presence of advertisements, erection of mega-constructions…) and does not remain within the noble enclave of 
metaphysics and high culture. In contrast to the vision of early philosophers meditating on the concept, the sublime is 
believed to be commodified and reified through economic activities in a number of sectors such as tourism and construction. 
See C. Bell & J. Lyall “The Accelerated Sublime: Landscape, Tourism, and Identity,” 2002 for a more comprehensive 
discussion.  
There are alternative approaches in contemporary thinking, mostly in post-structural academic circles, to the notion of the 
sublime with quite different focuses. One of them is formulated by Jean-Luc Nancy whose wager is to delineate an 
alternative version of sublime that leaves out its baggage of grandeur, ecstasy and pathos. Jacques Derrida is another 
prominent name who embraces the idea of the sublime especially in Kant’s conceptualization, by virtue of its consideration 
of formlessness to include the registers of the non-presence and the unrepresentable. In a sense, what these three thinkers do 
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success of the national development project is measured by its performance in struggling, 
transforming and taming nature (Bozdoğan, 2001). In a word, the strength of any given 
nation becomes commensurable with its ability to defy and alter its physical surroundings and 
geographical limitations.   
However, the project of nation-building in early republican Turkey was far from being 
smooth and homogeneous. First of all, modern Western architecture was far from being a 
homogenous and linearly progressing set of choices and practices; it involved several 
contradictions and diverse architectural styles and approaches (Colquhoun, 1981) (Hitchcock, 
1987). Risking over-simplification, one can talk about two predominant architectural 
tendencies during the interwar period: On the one hand, there was the Bauhaus Movement 
which promoted simplicity, functionalism and economism, while the Neoclassical style, on 
the other hand, was more of an eclectic, stylistic and monumental architectural attitude 
(Tekeli, 1984) (Bell & Lyall, 2002). It should be reckoned that this nation-building project in 
question took place in a non-Western context which engenders its own hybridity and 
complexity (Bozdoğan, 2001). Even though the two pre-dominant tendencies of 
modernization of the society and creating a new nation seemed to overlap in most cases, they 
competed and gained superiority over one another depending on the conjectural power 
relations of competing political discourses. However, in most cases of conflict between 
universal architectural/aesthetic trends and vernacular conditions, it appeared that it was in 
fact the latter in which the Kemalist project invested most.  
The aim of modernist Turkish nationalists was not limited to industrialization and 
economic development, but included the creation of ‘civilized’, westernized, and 
modern subjects. Rather than aspiring to be an ethnocentric project of authenticity, 
Turkish national identity was primarily a modernist project of total cultural 
transformation. Thus, national identity was subservient to the project of modernity 
(understood as westernization). In other words, modernity was the ultimate ideal and 
the national form was important and necessary as a requirement of that modernity 
(Akman, 2004: 110). 
 
  It is true that railways across the country, grand avenues in prominent city centers, 
ornamental buildings, giant statues incorporating heroic narratives of nation-building 
contributed to the collective self-imagination of an advancing and industrializing nation. In 
many respects, the New Architecture displayed a staid attitude with its strong emphasis on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
is to relocate the notion of the sublime from the aesthetics of grandeur and ecstasy to a “heterotopias,” the field of affect. In 
this kind of definition, the sublime serves as a resistance against the rigid dualities of modernity – presence/non-presence, 
subjectivity/objectivity. This emphasis on the concept of the sublime would compel us to reconsider the interaction between 
the subjects and the Other in the blurring boundaries of each one’s interests, aspirations, desires and enjoyments. See J. 
Rosiek, “Maintaing the Sublime: Heidegger and Adorno,” 2000 for a more detailed examination of this subject. 
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deeds of moderateness and frugality. However, it was also possible to witness entertaining 
and even playful examples. Izmir Kültürpark and, Izmir International Fair and Youth Park 
were some products of early Republican architectural culture which attracted and/or created 
joyful and large crowds. Going against earlier architectural trends, they functioned as popular 
places of gathering and recreation with important democratic undercurrents (Bozdoğan, 
2001). Additionally, the use of electricity translated into neon lights, projectors and other 
unprecedented forms of lighting was “a key ingredient in the spirit of celebration, youth, 
optimism, and progress” (Bozdoğan, 2001: 132). This duality can also be observed in the 
cleavage between two forms of public display of industry and progress, namely popular 
magazines of technology and official Turkish publications. The former was about the 
fascinating images of the futuristic American technology while the latter was solemnly 
showing off its modest but actual technological and industrial accomplishment (Bozdoğan, 
2001: 116).    
 In short, the whole nation-building process in the early republican era was very much 
about exorcizing former identities from social space. The primary objective of the Kemalist 
program was to reproduce the ‘Western civilization’ in Turkey by creating modern spaces and 
pedagogically interfering in daily practices (Said, 1994). The discourse of progress supported 
by publicly visible images had been a handy tool to flatten out class-based inequalities or 
urban-rural diversion as well as being a source of legitimacy throughout the first decades of 
the republican Turkey (Bozdoğan, 2001). Masses were summoned for desiring the process of 
‘catching up with the contemporary civilization’ insofar as a corporatist picture was rendered 
in which ‘everyone’ was believed to make sacrifices by adapting a modest, frugal, waste-
aversive life style. Public depictions of the ‘prospering nation’ presented a harmonious 
picture of the society in which the city-dweller and the peasant – two poles of the gap in 
effect then – co-existed peacefully and free of any conflict (Bozdoğan, 2001). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Kemalist modernization project carried out a pedagogical 
mission to transform the society by intervening its daily habits and rituals, this project could 
not preclude ‘unintended consequences’ in the long-run. Popular appropriation of public 
spaces created by the Kemalist state itself opened a space for collective action by exploiting 
the oscillations and vicissitudes in the hegemonic order (Batuman, 2002). Like all other 
forms of hegemony, the modernization project enforced by the elite cadres proved to be 
incomplete despite all its efforts of wiping out the Ottoman legacies and of strictly controlling 
people’s daily practices. After seven decades, in a context where a rather distinct form of 
hegemony prevails under the rule of an Islamist party, we come across with a ‘crazy project’ 
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that demonstrates a remarkable contrast and also a certain extent of continuity with, but 
exceeding the financial and physical magnitudes of, spatial projects of the early republican 
nation-building program.  
 
  
Delirious Istanbul64 in the Context of Neo-Nationalism and Late Captalism 
 
    Kanal Istanbul might be regarded as a curios case combining the neoliberal 
discourse of feasibility along with prospective security and sterility, and the populist rhetoric 
flattering collective emotions such as national pride, aspiration towards grandeur, and 
“catching up” with the West at the imaginary level. At the outset, the project, in case of its 
successful materialization will undoubtedly stand for the national grandeur for embodying the 
triumph against natural forces and geographical limitations. In the animation of the project, 
the landscape that will sit at the heart of the canal is saturated with colorfully illuminated 
skyscrapers and a number of bridges which are reminiscent of canal cities like Venice or 
Amsterdam. In that respect, the Kanal Istanbul project, on the one hand, invests in a playful 
consumerism by visually evoking the refined tastes of the West and, at the same time, 
summons popular fascination with the futuristic urban panorama, oddly enough in 
retrospective fashion. Accordingly, the presentation of Kanal Istanbul would suggest that this 
is an anachronistically modernist and developmentalist initiation. AKP’s former professional 
stance which pursued measures such as feasibility, utility, functionality, and ‘doability’ seems 
to be shifted now with the declaration of such a mega-project even though the media 
organizations supportive of the government have passionately advocated otherwise. Indeed, 
there are several reasons to believe that the declaration of this project as AKP’s campaign 
pledge before the general elections in 2011 is not a political promise in its traditional meaning 
– a mutual agreement between voters and politicians to be fulfilled by the latter in a 
foreseeable future – but an already accomplished political action. In order to get a better grip 
on this problematic, we should now cast a look at this project’s context where AKP appears to 
be the hegemonic actor both in the realm of high politics and in the banal details of everyday 
life.  
Cihan Tuğal, in his germinal book, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic 
Challenge to Capitalism, examines how a decades-long organic crisis with its dimensions of 
                                                 
64 Here, Rem Koolhaas’ germinal work, Delirious New York: A Retroactive Manifesto for Manhattan, is alluded. See H. 
Foster, “Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes,” 2002 for an insightful discussion of Koolhaas’ architectural and aesthetic 
discourse.  
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class struggle and spatiality is managed by the AKP as the party founds and reiterates its 
hegemony. According to Tuğal, the key element in the party’s long-running political success 
was its readiness and resourcefulness to work at the everyday level of ordinary people (Tuğal, 
Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, 2009). Despite its 
Islamic roots, the AKP’s major urban strategy, at least in the first year of its rule, has been to 
de-Islamize the city landscape by removing pronounced Islamic symbols which are usually 
perceived as defiant and belligerent. One of the most obvious instances is the re-construction 
of the municipality building in Sultanbeyli, a prominent bastion of political-Islam in Istanbul.  
Central to Sultanbeyli’s spatial symbolism was the municipal building, the windows 
and color of which resembled those of a mosque. The building was highly visible 
from the highway. After the AKP took control of the municipality, it initiated a 
conscious eradication of Islamist “symbolic space.” The municipal building built by 
the Islamists was demolished by the ex-Islamists (Tuğal, 2009: 208).    
 
Another critical feature of AKP’s urban policies is to embrace the fundamental 
neoliberal propositions: carrying out a dencentralized, rational, and effective local 
administration will cancel out the injustices and inequalities induced by the market (Tuğal, 
Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, 2009). On the one hand, 
the AKP promotes one of the central tenets of modernist social engineering,” while, on the 
other hand, the primacy of central planning in creating new public spaces is abandoned by the 
party cadres (Tuğal, 2009: 209). Another point of the AKP’s divergence from the early 
republican practices is that it usually prefers a gradual approach in conducting urban 
reconstruction plans rather than venturing on an en masse restructuring of the city (Tuğal, 
2009). Moreover, it would not be a far-fetched argument that legal arrangements concerning 
the powers and activities of municipalities throughout the 1980s, 90s and 2000s have paved 
the way to the effective implementation of neoliberal policies in Istanbul. “All these laws 
grant the municipalities the power to undertake major urban projects, overriding the existence 
checks, controls, and regulations in the legal system” (Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008: 14). This 
situation can be regarded as at odds with the strict commitment to the laws in effect 
considering the legal procedure of Ankara’s urban planning that was starkly carried out by the 
political authority (Altaban, 1998) (Tankut, 1993). Privatization becomes a pervasive 
phenomenon in multiple sectors, and this becomes visible as the role of contractors 
[müteahhit] and sub-contractors increase in the construction sector (Candan & Kolluoğlu, 
2008). Apart from public authorities, several other actors from the private sector – both 
national and transnational –are introduced to the game (Geniş, 2007). 
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It is important to recognize that the figure of the contractor gains prominence and 
replaces that of the architect, which used to stand at the discursive node of architecture and 
construction activities. Although the first ten years of the 2000s can be regarded as the 
‘golden age of architecture’ in terms of the growing number of architects, flourishing 
architectural publications, better functioning institutional frameworks and technological 
innovations, economic monopolization, stylistic mediocrity and repetitiveness are pervasive 
symptoms within the prevailing mentality, “more building, less architecture” (İnceoğlu, 2010) 
(Şentürer, 2010). In contrast with the architect whom the early republican regime celebrated 
as a pedagogical figure by virtue of his ability of balancing the principles of rationality, 
functionality, and economism with artistic faculties; the contractor emerges as the popular 
figure of the self-made man, and an entrepreneur striving towards maximizing his profits. In 
the context of modern-day Turkey, a number of private construction firms have become quite 
salient but none of them draws as much attention as Ali Ağaoğlu, the owner of the Ağaoğlu 
conglomerate whose tag line is ‘architect of life’65. Ağaoğlu can be counted as a celebrity 
who does not refrain from participating in talk-shows, television and magazine interviews. In 
his extensive public appearance in the media, Ağaoğlu explicitly displays his opulence in a 
rather tactless manner: counting his cash during a live broadcast, constantly mentioning his 
car collection, showing off his supermodel girlfriends, and so on (Türk, 2011)… At the same 
time, despite these conspicuous demonstrations of his wealth, Ağaoğlu manages to present 
himself as a ‘man of the people’. Ağaoğlu does not hide that he rejoices in earthly blessings – 
sports cars, beautiful women, luxurious residences – and he obtains a masculine and orthodox 
tone in his statements regarding his lechery, homophobia – or should I say his hetero-pride –, 
insatiable and hunger for power and success (Türk, 2011). Taking all that into account, 
Ağaoğlu exemplifies what Slavoj Zizek calls an ‘obscenely enjoying’ character. In one of his 
insightful deductions, Tuğal asserts that “[i]t was characteristic of the AKP discourse and 
self-presentation that businessmen and professionals (and especially the financial experts) 
metonymically came to stand for the whole population” (Tuğal, Passive Revolution: 
Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, 2009). The case of Ağaoğlu fits into this 
conceptualization, hence his ability to present himself a self-made ‘man of the people’.66  
                                                 
65 ‘Ağaoğlu: Yaşam Mimarı’ 
 
66 This seems paradoxical because the figure of Entrepreneur occupies an exceptional position as “the innovator who can 
take risks like no other, who will create jobs by undertaking investment, and who will be the engine of economic growth and 
efficiency, providing thereby the supply-side ‘base’ for the consumption-led ‘superstructure’ of a late capitalist utopia.” Note. 
From “Jouissance and Antagonism in the Forms of the Commune: A Critique of Biopolitical Subjectivity,” by Y. Madra & 
C.Özselçuk, 2010, Rethinking Marxism p. 491. Copyright 2010 by Y. Madra & C. Özselçuk. Reprinted with permission. 
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In the advertisement of one of his projects, he contends with masculine self-
confidence: “I dreamed of gardens on the tenth floor. I did it. Now they will exist!”67 This 
self-confident posture can also be applied to Ağaoğlu’s unshaken belief in his country and 
nation. In a newspaper interview, he claims that this project had been considered during the 
Ottoman periods, and opening a second Bosporus would be not a crazy project for Turkey 
which can handle it quite easily.68 Looking at the two utterances of Ağaoğlu, one is tempted 
to draw a parallelism between those and Erdoğan’s speech in the presentation of the Kanal 
Istanbul project which makes a strong emphasis on the ‘primacy’ of imagination. The 
optimist and self-confident nationalist rhetoric, that becomes prevalent in the heydays of 
neoliberalism in Turkey, can be discerned here: “I dreamed of it. Now it will exist!” 69    
Leaving aside the ‘rakishness’, Erdoğan and Ağaoğlu have a number of other 
resemblances. As said earlier, both Ağaoğlu and Erdoğan use an extremely populist language. 
They present themselves as ‘men of the people’ in their own terms. In their addressing of the 
subject of urban transformation, the populist register of both names’ speeches becomes 
palpable. Erdoğan contributes to the Örnektepe transformation project carried out by the 
Beyoğlu Municipality with a written statement: “My people [benim milletim] do not deserve 
living in slums. Dwelling in houses under the risk of being demolished by earthquakes does 
not suit my citizen. We are already late. Now we must take this new step.”70 Ağaoğlu’s 
statement is more elaborate but strongly resonates with Erdoğan’s: “Because everyone in this 
country deserves living in a beautiful house of good quality with a swimming pool.”71  
At this point, Ağaoğlu takes a step ahead and embarks on a pastiche sequel to his first 
                                                 
 
67 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XBjHzml5INU 
 
68 Ağaoğlu: “İkinci bir boğaz yapmak çılgın bir proje değil.” (2011, April 27). Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://konut.milliyet.com.tr/agaoglu-ikinci-bir-bogaz-yapmak-cilgin-bir-proje-degil-
/agaoglu/haberdetay/27.04.2011/1383169/default.htm 
 
69 “We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of 
a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst 
architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the 
end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement. He 
not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the 
law to his modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. 
Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be 
steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and 
the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and 
mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.” Karl Marx, Capital: Volume I. Retrieved June 25, 2012 from  
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch07.htm 
 
70 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Jt-Fesb2ts to watch the introductory film of Örnektepe Transformation Project by 
Beyoğlu municipality.  
 
71 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XBjHzml5INU to watch the commercial film.  
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TV commercial in which the director of the commercial film, Sinan Çetin becomes the cast 
mate of Ağaoğlu. In the opening scene, Çetin shows up and gives several shots to act like 
Ağaoğlu in numerous takes until he admits his failure. Following that Ağaoğlu steps in and 
instructs him to relax in front of the camera before he starts to play his part. Here, besides the 
emphasis on Ağaoğlu’s ultimate access to knowledge on every field, it is conveyed that he 
does not have anything to hide as he ‘shows off’ every aspect, out of sincerity and self-
confidence. Nonetheless, the question to be raised at this point is “beyond everything that is 
displayed to the subject […] what is being concealed from me?” (Copjec, 1994: 36). The 
exhibitionist move of the TV commercial can be read as an endeavor to  suspend the fiction 
by inviting the behind-the-scenes register. In fact, the gesture of unraveling what is – claimed 
to be –hidden to the spectator does not simply entail a moment of enlightenment. In his 
discussion of commodity fetishism, Zizek incisively points out that “the unmasking of the 
secret is not sufficient” (Zizek, 2008: 8). In Zizek’s reading of Marx through a 
psychoanalytical scanning, the secret of the commodity is its form rather than its content, 
hence the ‘commodity-form’ (Zizek, 2008). In this line of thinking, focusing on the 
exhibitionist gesture in order to grasp its meaning would be a useful approach. Ağaoğlu’s 
obscenity – the simultaneous display of excessive debauchery within affluence and self-
proclamation of being ‘one of us’ – in the sense that psychoanalysis employs the term is 
intimately related to this attitude of exhibitionism. 
Skyscrapers can be regarded as another form of obscene display of vertical arrogance 
within a context where they function as the new monuments of national development. For 
they embody the national delusions of grandeur supported by the imaginary aspect of 
skyscrapers’ phallic appearance (Grigg, 2008). In a setting where the discourse of 
‘belatedness’ is operative, the spread of skyscrapers can be presented as symbols of 
development inasmuch as they require extensive financial resources and advanced technical 
know-how. The decoration of skyscrapers located in Istanbul’s financial centers with huge 
Turkish flags in the national Victory Day in 2011 was an excellent demonstration of the 
marriage between neoliberalism and nationalism.72 Another example is a recently released 
advertisement of a new skyscraper in which political leaders of super-powers give speeches 
about the growing importance of Turkey. “I am trying to make a statement about the 
importance of Turkey, not just to the United States but to the world” utters Barrack Obama, in 
                                                 
72 İstanbul’da bayrak şöleni. (2007, August 30). Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://haber.mynet.com/istanbulda-bayrak-soleni-335583-guncel/ 
Kentel, F. (2011, September 3). Beton milliyetçilik – milliyetçi beton. Taraf. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.taraf.com.tr/ferhat-kentel/makale-beton-milliyetcilik-milliyetci-beton.htm 
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the opening sequence of the commercial which continues with the narrator’s words: “The 
world speaks only about the best. A unique magnificence meets with rising Turkey. Above all 
that has been built so far… In the new finance capital of the world, Europe’s highest 
structure, Istanbul’s new fashion center: a new age project with its superlative design. The 
world will turn and look at it.”73 It is ironic that in this mood of self-assurance, the 
recognition of (the whole world but most importantly) the West is desperately needed. 
Moreover, skyscrapers and other high structures can be considered as the inherent 
transgression of the AKP’s discourse since the historical peninsula where the Ottoman spatial 
heritage resides is now surrounded by them. The silhouette of the old Istanbul – ‘our own 
history’ as Prime Minister Erdoğan puts it – is defiled by the high rise buildings on the 
background.74      
The surplus project of Kanal Istanbul, the ‘crazy island’ is emblematic of the 
mentality of belatedness. As mentioned in the introduction, a crescent and star shaped island 
was planned to be created with the soil and other materials to be gained from the excavation 
of the project. So what is the point of creating this kind of island? One possible explanation is 
the political power’s intention to mark the physical landscape with its national pride and 
ambitions of grandeur. In this symbolic grid, space is formulated as something passive 
waiting to be shaped by its human masters. In fact, this kind of relationship – masculine 
brutality deployed on space – can be euphemized by complimentary gestures. For instance, 
Prime Minister Erdoğan describes the state in which Istanbul was when he came to office as 
follows:  
I knew that we have a diamond at hand but I believed that this needs to be worked 
with dexterity. While we were raising Istanbul on her feet, we pondered several 
dimensions because Istanbul was betrayed, spoiled, and badly damaged… This is a 
betrayal against the history of Istanbul, against our own history. Now, we are 
endeavoring to recuperate and transform it (Erdoğan, 2011: my translation).75  
 
This statement evokes the male fantasy in which the knight in shining armor rescues 
the powerless woman from her desperate condition. Here, Istanbul with its precious essence 
was defiled by other ruthless men, more precisely those who had previously held the office, 
                                                 
 
73 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=alkGeKluIHU to watch the entire commercial film.  
 
74 İstanbul’un silueti böyle değişti! (2011, September 14). Milliyet. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/istanbul-un-silueti-boyle-degisti-/gundem/gundemdetay/14.09.2011/1438325/default.htm 
75  "Elimizde bir elmas parçası olduğunu biliyordum ama bunu ince ince usta ellerde sabırla işlenmesi gerektiğine 
inanıyordum. İstanbul'u ellerinden tutup yeniden ayağa kaldırırken çok boyutlu düşündük çünkü İstanbul ihanete uğramıştı, 
İstanbul'a yazık ettiler, darbe üzerine darbe vurdular... Bu İstanbul tarihine geçmişimize ihanettir. Şimdi biz bunu yeniden 
geliştirip dönüştürme çabası veriyoruz." Shopping Fest oldu Galataport da olacak. (2011, March 26). Sabah. Retrieved July 
03, 2012, from http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2011/03/26/shopping_fest_oldu_galataport_da_olacak 
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and it is now waiting to be purified by its savior.   
However, there is another edge to the case of the crazy island with regard to its 
imaginary spectator. It would not be far-fetched to think that the interlocutor of the island 
with the shape of a crescent and star is a bird’s eye-view, possibly conceived of as a gaze 
looking down onto the Earth from space. It is, in that sense, a display of power; the power to 
shape the physical world not merely out of necessity, but also out of pleasure. Apart from the 
intentions of grandiosity, the making of this island would possibly address a gaze 
‘transcendent’ to worldly boundaries. It aims at conveying the message to those who are able 
to cast this kind of gaze – most probably the West – that Turkey can now reflect back to this 
formerly overbearing gaze. Yet again, this sort of self-identity is constructed by gearing for 
the Other’s gaze, gaze of the West: “The imagined Western gaze is an integral part of this 
[oriental] identity,” even in the latter’s most seemingly assertive moments (Ahıska, 2003: 
365). 
 The relationship between social relations/political power and space carries inherently 
transgressive characteristics. The modern paradigm ignores the dynamism of space, and 
reduces it to a passive material to be shaped. More accurately, modern spatial practices 
transgress the very reality-materiality of space in line with voluntarism by making cold 
abstractions as ‘absolute political space’ imposes itself as reality despite its abstract feature 
(Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 1998). In addition to that this already transgressive 
paradigm exercising masculine brutality onto space is also transgressed with the inauguration 
of a certain type of enjoyment. The notion of deliberate and detailed planning through which 
cold abstraction can inscribe itself onto space is violated by a newly pervading symbolic 
order that reproduces itself through its ‘inherent transgression’. The enjoyment that arises 
from this transgressive gesture becomes crucial in the functioning of fantasy. The fantasy of 
‘historical necessity’ in the creation of political spaces is now replaced by a spectacular and 
playful tendency which does not attribute to itself any notion of necessity but pleasure.  
 The case of Kanal Istanbul becomes meaningful in this context. The project was 
presented as a continuation of Mustafa Kemal’s76 nation-building program which had been 
halted for decades because of narrow-minded, corrupt and demagogue Kemalists. Apart from 
Erdoğan’s reference to the atavistic figures prominent for the official Turco-Islamic history in 
the presentation of Kanal Istanbul, the project was also claimed to be emblematic of Turkey’s   
                                                 
76 The AKP carefully distinguishes the cult of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk from his political cadres and the Kemalist program in 
general. While his actions are highly praised, the political mentality dominant in his time, namely Kemalist is strongly 
denounced for being authoritarian, elitist and etatist.    
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‘catching up with Western civilization’. On the one hand, the AKP appeared to internalize 
basic Kemalist aspirations such as creating national and modern – albeit deviated from its 
original description – spaces by ignoring the ‘reality’ of space shaped by the existing set of 
social relations. Furthermore, novelty seems to be a shared promoted feature shared by both 
hegemonic visions regarding spatial activities inasmuch as crafting ‘brand new’ spaces is 
privileged not solely by the early republican elite but by the AKP as well. However, on the 
other hand, Kanal Istanbul bears the characteristics of neoliberal mega-projects with respect 
to its playful and spectacular aspect inciting consumer activity while dislodging 
disadvantageous groups that are not able to conform to the mandate of excessive 
consumption. Nevertheless, in addition to all that, there is also the issue of enjoyment which 
remains beyond the grasp of this sort of historical comparison as well as of any discursive 
analysis. 
 As an example to the weak spots of the AKP hegemony, Cihan Tuğal draws our 
attention to the party’s tendency to behave like a ‘postmodern prince’ by deliberately 
“escaping standardization so as to maintain appeal to different sectors, demonstrating that 
hegemony must be reconsidered in the context of the twenty-first century” (Tuğal, 2009: 
228). Tuğal points out the risks of losing the grip on the masses for the AKP in a context of an 
ongoing passive revolution by claiming the necessity of standardization in party’s 
construction of an effective hegemonic order (Tuğal, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the 
Islamic Challenge to Capitalism, 2009). This argument is in accordance with one of Tuğal’s 
major assumptions, that no hegemony can be totally complete and coherent in itself but its 
limitations are always marked by structural inconsistency or contradiction. At this juncture, 
this research aims to question this equation between limitation and inconsistency by 
consulting Lacanian psychoanalysis, and focusing on the province of enjoyment in which the 
relationship between hegemony and contradiction may be understood in a new light.         
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TRANSGRESSIVE ENJOYMENT AND INTERPASSIVITY IN LATE 
CAPITALIST TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
Psychoanalysis, especially the Lacanian revision of Freud’s works, has gradually been 
recognized as a useful tool in explaining the notions of subject and identity in various fields 
especially cultural studies and social-political theory. Several names influenced by Jacques 
Lacan’s works, such as Slavoj Zizek, Ernesto Laclau and, Judith Butler, have contributed 
greatly to the ongoing debates in social theory with their different thought-provoking and 
vigorous approaches. Even though these names do not agree with each other in most cases, it 
is still possible to talk about a Lacanian psychoanalytical approach becoming ever more 
influential in academic circles. One apparent advantage of Lacanian psychoanalysis is its 
sensibility to dimensions often overlooked or dismissed by various approaches in the social 
sciences, concerning the individual rather than social dynamics. This asserted clear-cut 
boundary between individual and society is rigorously debunked by Lacanian scholars while 
giving us seminal insights into new ways of understanding the relationship between the 
human psyche and social forces. Stressing the concept of enjoyment (jouissance) is one of 
these novel insights of Lacanian psychoanalysis.  
The discussion of enjoyment is pertinent to the current situation in Turkey where a de-
centered political hegemony institutes itself by means of carrying out ‘affective’ socio-spatial 
performances. Although the AKP hegemony has its limitations and contradictions, it would 
not be wholly correct to take these as weaknesses which will eventually undermine the 
party’s hold of its hegemonic position. Conceptualizing the notion of contradiction with its 
complex relation to jouissance against a Lacanian backdrop would provide us an alternative, 
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and perhaps a more profound understanding of how ideology interacts with its contradictions 
in general, and strategies pursued by the AKP hegemony so as to foster certain types of 
collective enjoyment.        
 
 
Subjectivity, Imago, and Spatiality in Psychoanalysis 
 
In Freud’s formulation, the subject is the effect of space, and “[s]ubjectivity is a 
continual process of negotiation with space, of attempting to locate and reassure one’s self of 
one’s limits and to confirm the place of reality” (Kirby, 1996: 84). Spatiality is central also in 
Lacan’s articulation of subjectivity, and its appearance in one of the three Lacanian registers, 
the ‘Imaginary’. What Lacan argues is that, as the child grows up, he needs to identify with 
the imago, in the mirror or in others’ appearances, so as to conceive of himself as a unified 
body. This identification is constitutive of the subject in enabling the child to ‘demarcate’ 
himself as a psychical entity separated from his surroundings (Lacan, 1994). Here, we see the 
predicament of the subject in its endeavor to constitute itself as a spatially defined totality 
through the medium of an external object or subject. In other words, without that externality 
through which the subject’s image ‘virtually comes into being’, the subject is not capable of 
imagining itself as a self-contained entity. In that sense, the perception of self-wholeness 
comes with the price of depending on those ‘outside’ the ‘I’, and one can assert that this 
situation in itself would create the effect of lack. In this narrative, visuality and spatiality 
seems to have pivotal positions in the process of subject formation. Since the child 
(mis)recognizes himself in the mirror-image which is devoid of any actual reality, it would 
not be wrong to claim that subject is constituted in the virtual realm by “assum[ing] the 
identity of the image” (Pile, 1996: 123) (Copjec, 1994). Also, the mirror stage stages a radical 
discordance in the child’s sense of its anatomical incompleteness due to ‘perspectival 
limitations’. In simpler terms, the child can see only from one perspective while some of its 
anatomical parts remain outside its vision (Pile, 1996). Things get even more complicated 
here regarding the fact that the child’s body and the mirror are located in the ‘real’ world. 
Therefore, the child’s encounter with its image inaugurates a complex dialectic of spatio-
visual relations, inasmuch as the imago – which now becomes an innermost component of the 
child’s psyche – is located in an exterior world which has both visual and actual dimensions.   
The mirror situates the child within a space, but this space has a ‘de-realising’ effect. 
In the dialectic of identification with the reflection, the child learns to mimic the 
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morphology of its fictional image and the effect of this is to both create an obsession 
with space and to institute an air of unreality about spatial relationships. The child is 
‘captured’ in space, but the ‘spatial dialectic’ already separates the child from the 
‘nature’ of that space: the spatial dialectic operates through the constitutive opposition 
between the child’s fantasy of its own spatial relationships and its specular place in the 
world. There is a set of geographical questions here which would disrupt Lacan’s 
‘simple’ mirror. The child is situated within a multiplicity of dialectic spatialities: the 
child’s body, the virtual world of the mirror, the ‘real’ world which contains the 
mirror, and the child’s place in the world… (Pile, 1996: 124). 
 
This complex dialectic of spatial relations sets in motion an alienation effect derived 
from ‘méconnaissance’, or ‘mis-recognition’. The case of misrecognition is essential to the 
child’s ego constitution and its maintanance by a series of tactics protecting ego boundaries 
by employing strict schisms between ‘me’ and ‘not-me’. Yet, this process may also end up in 
the incapability to recognize ‘the desires of others’ by falling in love with one’s own image 
(Pile, 1996).  
The visual regime in Lacan’s theory does not merely consist of the subject. Different 
from social-constructivist approaches, there is a profound register of objectivity embodied by 
the gaze in the Lacanian framework of visuality. Here it would be apt to mention the 
Lacanian Real since the drives are intimately linked to this register. The gaze as the ‘scopic 
drive’, is often formulated as the eruption of the Real in the symbolic-visual regime.  
For Lacan, the encounter with the object (it is worth repeating that objects in 
psychoanalysis are objects for the whole mind, including people) is profoundly 
dialectical and is suspended within a visual regime: the dialectic situates the subject 
who vacillates between the look and the look back, where this subject position is 
profoundly disturbing (Pile, 1996: 126). 
 
The look back mentioned in the passage is the gaze. The gaze can roughly be 
described as a drive related to visuality and it functions as the ‘looking-back’ of the object in 
response to the subject’s look (eye) upon it. So what is the relationship between the gaze and 
the I? The gaze determines the ‘I’ in the visible by photo-graphing the ‘I’. This is to say that, 
the gaze “determines the complete visibility of the I” and maps the I “on a perceptual grid” 
(Copjec, 1994: 67). The gaze is radically subversive of the potent position of the subject’s 
‘eye’ by undermining the established meaning system prevalent in the ‘Symbolic’ supported 
by the Imaginary – that is the believed-to-be the clear-cut schism between the active subject 
and the passive object. To put it more simply, the fantasy of the  all-seeing subject in a matrix 
where objects appears as surveilled (eyed) elements cannot be sustained when the object 
reflects back on the subject. This is the eruption of the Real in the visual realm, and any 
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encounter with it causes anxiety and the feeling of ‘uncanniess’77 on the subject by distorting 
the subject’s indisputably master position in the visual regime (Pile, 1996) (Copjec, 1994).  
The split between the eye and the gaze is not achieved without cost, for it is instituted 
by an anxiety – the threat of castration […] The gaze slides over this anxiety and 
escapes consciousness. In this spatial topography of the mind, the gaze always lies 
behind or beyond understanding – once more evoking the idea that the subject’s 
relationship to its specular image is founded by a profound failure-to-recognize its 
place […] Anxiety – the threat of castration – speaks of further qualities of the visual: 
fantasy and desire. The child that sees its image is already fantasising about the image 
and its relationship to it. The child is captured by the object in front of it, thus the 
image becomes what the child wants to see – it is constructed out of this gaze and 
infused with desire (Pile, 1996: 128).  
  
Space, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, is endowed with an uncanny form of subjectivity 
rather than being a passive and static backdrop waiting to be shaped by its human masters. 
The space of vision has a privileged status in the determination of subjectivity since desire is 
formed in its contact with the field of visuality. In this mise-en-scene, the subject is not at the 
center but it is defined against another center where a lack emerges, privileging one signifier, 
the phallus (Pile, 1996). At this juncture, one should not miss that the question of power has a 
primary significance in spatial organizations. The stern control of space implies an arrogant 
attitude and will to power with the intention of reproducing the existing value and meaning 
system through the creation of phallic spaces. In most cases of the exertion of power, space is 
marked by the phallus and a masculine arrogance/brutality (Pile, 1996). According to 
Lefebvre, capitalist spatial relations require a cold abstraction in which space is castrated, and 
the body is immersed into the visual regime (Lefebvre, 1998). 
 
 
 Late Capitalism, Enjoyment, and the Suspension of the Law 
 
Although the role of ‘the Imaginary’ is pivotal in the constitution of the 
psychoanalytical subject, visuality in itself is insufficient to illustrate the complete story of 
the emergence of the psychoanalytical subject. Here we are also to deal with ‘the Symbolic’. 
At the interface between the Imaginary and the Symbolic, the internalization of the mirror-
imago and other images by the subject takes place in the symbolic order (Fink, 1995). 
                                                 
77 According to Freud, anxiety is the authentic feeling. It is the universal currency of affect which means that every emotion 
can be translated into it. One can talk about a basic equivalence between affect and jouisscance since both signals  a 
satisfaction that comes with a deeply disturbing and even painful experience.    
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Whereas the imaginary is the order of what we see, the symbolic is the structure 
supporting and regulating the visible world. As the realm of language, it structures our 
experience, providing not only the words we use to describe ourselves and our world, 
but also the very identities we take up as our own (McGowan, 2007).  
 
According to Lacan, the symbolic is always at the center concerning the constitution 
of the subject (Stravrakakis, 2010). This can roughly be explained due to the fact that human 
beings are born into language and defined by its tools – by being named – from the very 
beginning. For Lacan, in the simplest terms, the subject is constituted with a lack caused by 
the primordial loss of the object (of desire) in the subject’s immersion into the symbolic order 
– the order of formal/differential relations (Zizek, 1997a). In its passage to the Symbolic, the 
subject becomes resigned to the impossibility of satisfying the ‘mOther’ and steps into the 
Symbolic by incorporating the lack emanating from this resignation.78 Against this 
background, subjectivity in psychoanalysis becomes the space of identification through 
which every identity is constituted within the symbolic realm (Stravrakakis, 2010). By the 
same token, it is this lack which deploys desire, a psychic dynamic striving for the object (of 
desire) – that is an object that is already lost, probably never exists, and unattainable. With 
respect to the unattainability of the object, satisfaction is always postponed in desire. Another 
point is that desire emerges in the Symbolic, in other words in language. The subject is 
always-already in the symbolic order, and there is no form of subjectivity prior to the 
inscription of the Symbolic. It is none other than the symbolic register which bounds us to 
authority and power insofar as the Other’s, the regulative node of the Symbolic, command is 
irresistible and the subject, by virtue of its de-centeredness, is immanently dependent to the 
Other (Stravrakakis, 2010: 59). Nevertheless, one should not miss the fact that the symbolic 
order and language are also structurally lacking orders in themselves. Due to the imperfect 
feature of the Symbolic, the consistency of both the Other and the subject positions within the 
symbolic grid are under constant threat whereas, paradoxically, the positivity of the 
‘fetishistic-object’ take place when the two lacks, those in the subject and in the Other 
overlap (Zizek, 1997a). The Symbolic continuously tries to conceal or disregard this bilateral 
lack with the support of fantasy. What fantasy does is to provide a rationale for the impasse 
of desire caused by the Symbolic’s structural deficiency. By this way, we are able to assume 
and embrace our identities by ignoring the fact that there will be an unbridgeable gap 
between the signifiers of any given identity and our subject positions (Stravrakakis, 2010). 
                                                 
78 This is basically the scene of castration in the Oedipal complex where the Father (or the Name-of-the-Father) steps in and 
prohibits the incest-taboo. Lacan deliberately chooses to coin this prohibition as the Name-of-the-Father since it stands for 
the pure signifier that brings about the Symbolic.  
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As stressed earlier, the subject is integrated into the Symbolic by bringing along its 
constitutive lack which emerges with the loss of the object. Yet, lack is not the sole effect of 
the scene where the subject is lured into the symbolic order. Along with that, the Symbolic 
brings about an excess which is conceptualized as enjoyment (jouissance) by Lacanian 
psychoanalysis (Stravrakakis, 2010). Jouissance resides in the Real which precedes and 
evades language (the Symbolic). Unlike ‘Law-abiding’ desire, jouissance offers instant 
satisfaction to the subject and it has the incredible potential to disrupt, subvert and 
‘transgress’ the functioning of both desire and the Symbolic. Despite the fact that the drive 
does not require any permission or guidance from the Other, it would be erroneous to assume 
that it is wholly divorced from the symbolic order (Fink, Desire and the Drives, 1997).   
On the one hand, the symbolic ideal forms the background for the transgressive 
practice; on the other, this practice, through the enjoyment it procures, may serve ‘to 
bolster the ideal and the objectives it structures’ […] Every effective hegemony has to 
operate on all these levels, co-opting and neutralizing its radical potential – and 
undergoing in the process, gradual shifts that, however, do not threaten the 
reproduction of hierarchal order (the basic parameters of domination” (Stravrakakis, 
2010: 69). 
 
As cited earlier, all symbolic orders are by definition incomplete and lacking. Yet, for 
any hegemony to sustain its longevity, it needs to take its own failure into account by 
conditioning its own transgression. In this vein, the effectiveness of ideology is marked by its 
ability to construct “a space of false disidentification” (Fleming & Spicer, 2003: 167).  
By the same token, symbolic identification is not sufficient to hold a given society 
together, in Zizek’s perspective, but the bond between its members involves a shared 
relationship to the Thing, to ‘enjoyment incarnated’, in his own terms (Zizek, 1993). At this 
point, the unconscious side of ideology aside from its visible symbolic/legal order comes into 
the picture where the ground for resistance becomes slippery as “the public ideological 
message is sustained by a series of obscene supplements” (Stravrakakis, 2010: 71). In this 
setting, the Other does not call for ‘full cooperation’ with the provisions of the public Law 
but clandestinely encourages its subjects to transgress them (Stravrakakis, 2010).  
Psychoanalysis has long been concerned with modern society and the effect of its set 
of relations on the psyche. For Freud himself, the raison d’être of psychoanalysis is indeed 
the psychic disorders caused by the repressive mechanisms necessary for a well-functioning 
modern ‘civilization’ (Freud, 1961). But it was Jacques Lacan who drew attention to 
capitalism by positing a kind of homology between surplus-value and surplus-enjoyment. 
According to Lacan, university discourse – of which capitalism is a part along with modern 
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hegemony of scientific knowledge – is capable of producing surplus value qua jouissance 
(Vighi, 2010). Hence his famous ‘reprimand’ to his students in the tide of the 1968 
movement: “What you aspire to as revolutionaries is a master. You will get one!” Zizek’s take 
on the issue, which is different from that of Lacan, would be illustrative in order to 
understand the enjoyment regime of capitalism. 
The elementary feature of capitalism consists of its inherent structural imbalance, its 
innermost antagonistic character: the constant crisis, the constant revolutionizing of its 
conditions of existence. Capitalism has no "normal," balanced state: its "normal" state 
is the permanent production of an excess; the only way for capitalism to survive is to 
expand. Capitalism is thus caught in a kind of loop, a vicious circle, that was clearly 
designated already by Marx: producing more than any other socioeconomic formation 
to satisfy human needs, capitalism nonetheless also produces even more needs to be 
satisfied; the greater the wealth, the greater the need to produce more wealth. It should 
be clear, therefore, why Lacan designated capitalism as the reign of the discourse of 
the hysteric: this vicious circle of a desire, whose apparent satisfaction only widens 
the gap of its dissatisfaction, is what defines hysteria. A kind of structural homology 
exists between capitalism and the Freudian notion of the superego. The basic paradox 
of the superego also concerns a certain structural imbalance: the more we obey its 
command, the more we feel guilty, so that renunciation entails only a demand for 
more renunciation, repentance more guilt -- as in capitalism, where an increase in 
production to fill out the lack only widens the lack (Zizek, 1993: 209). 
 
According to Zizek, in capitalism’s hysteric discourse, the Master whose role is to 
regulate the excess becomes inoperative, and consequently the obscene superego runs the 
show without the Master’s regulative intervention (Zizek, 1993). The suspension of the 
Master’s function within the set of capitalist relations leads to a new type of administration of 
the excess, namely jouissance. In this setting, the production process is incorrectly depicted 
as the concealed dimension of ‘how things really are’. The production process works as the 
fetish that fascinates with its very presence (Zizek, 1997b). 
The argument that we are now living in a ‘post-ideological’ paradigm is another point 
problematized by Zizek as a part of his discussion of late capitalism. The illusion of a ‘post-
ideological’ society derives from the fact that nobody needs to believe in the context of late 
capitalism insofar as commodities believe in their place (Zizek, 1989). As to Zizek’s 
interpretation of Marx’s ‘commodity fetishism’, commodities – almost literally – acquire a 
life of their own due to the Real of our social reality. That is to say that the appearance of 
commodities endowed with magical powers is how ‘things really seem to us’ in a context 
where we participate in our social reality composed of a dominant set of social exchanges. 
Hereby, the set of capitalist relations gains an objective property with respect to the fact that 
its perpetuity does not depend on subjective consciousness. In the domain of jouissance, 
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positions of subject and object are inverted, and it is now commodities that believe and enjoy 
for us (Zizek, 1997b).  
By taking all those into consideration, psychoanalysis enables us to approach the 
questions of identity, subjectivity, identification, visuality and fetish from unconventional 
perspectives and opens up new horizons to conceptualize, challenge and subvert hegemonic 
forms and the existing ideology. In this psychoanalytical framework, political discourse in 
contemporary Turkey will be put under scrutiny with respect to the current political 
hegemony’s complex interaction with its own joussiance and radically transgressive 
dimension. The organization of jouissance by the ruling ideology in modern-day Turkey will 
be stressed throughout this chapter. Moreover, the visual dialectic in the psychoanalytical 
framework and the complex aspect of identification will form the basis of legitimacy in our 
discussion of the case of Kanal Istanbul throughout this chapter.  
 
“Make way for Turkey!”79 
 
Zizek mentions that in one of his essays written during the war years George Orwell 
praises a version of English patriotism emanating from the daily life of the lower classes as 
opposed to the ‘official’ and ‘stuffy’ version (Zizek, 1993). Add ‘musty and fusty’ to the two 
adjectives for the latter version, and such a discourse has been in effect for the last ten years 
in Turkey. After the AKP won the general elections and came to office in 2002, it re-
instigated privatization and urban transformation which had been decelerated since Özal’s 
death. Nevertheless, several legal decisions were made against the AKP government’s 
enterprises by the bureaucracy and the judicial body. Especially in the first five years of 
office, the party embraced an accusatory rhetoric against those two official branches. Less 
than three weeks after the AKP’s electoral victory, the president of the party, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, who then could not become the prime minister due to his political ban, sternly 
warned the bureaucracy: 
Here in the presence of the nation I want to call on the bureaucracy: Keep up with us. 
From now on, an unusual phase begins, note that. Because this is our shared destiny. 
Political cadres together with bureaucracy, all of us have to work day and night. That 
is why bureaucracy is in the position of driving away the dark clouds which has been 
there to date. In this respect, if they will ever be excess baggage, take no offence but, 
                                                 
79 ‘Açın Türkiye’nin önünü!’ This slogan is coined by Cem Uzan, one of the neoliberal ‘princes’ of 1990s, who ventured on 
politics by ‘buying himself’ a political party in. During the electoral campaigns in 2002, he used an excessive populist-
nationalist tone. Although there has never been a ‘warm relationship’ between the AKP and Uzan, the former had no 
difficulty to appropriate the latter’s discourse in the following years.   
65 
 
they should think about paying the price starting from today80 (Erdoğan, 2002, my 
translation). 
  
Throughout the following years, most of the cases in which the government and the 
bureaucracy ran counter to each other were about the role of private enterprises in public 
contracts. The public contract of the Galataport  project which was nullified by the then 
Deputy Prime Minister Abdüllatif Şener could be counted as one of those cases since the 
binding decision was made by having regard to the Council of State’s motion for the stay of 
execution.81 The Galataport project is of great symbolic importance since it was the first 
urban mega-project for Istanbul to be put into action under the rule of the AKP. The gravity of 
this incident can be observed in the Prime Minister Erdoğan’s personal tenacity even six 
years after its phase-out. In 2008, Erdoğan speculates on how things would be if the 
Galataport project had been realized: “If today Haydarpaşaport [the counterpart of 
Galataport in the Anatolian side] was realized, five billion dollars would be invested there so 
far.” And he continues addressing those who played a part in the rescission of the project: 
“They come and stand against us in the blink of an eye… What are they serving for?  Can 
anyone witness this kind of mentality, this sort of logic in any of developed countries? It is 
impossible.”82 After three years, Erdoğan brought up the issue again but this time in a more 
self-assured way: “When we helped her to get on her feet, Istanbul was betrayed. Even the 
judicial branch did not let us realize Galataport. We have lost some time but we will now 
finish both Galataport and Haydarpaşaport.”83  
Erdoğan made this statement in the opening of ‘Istanbul Fashion Week’ which can be 
taken as a context quite emblematic in itself. This is one of the mega-events whose numbers 
                                                 
80 “Bir de burada milletin huzurunda bürokrasiye seslenmek istiyorum. Bizi iyi takip edin. Hızımıza muhakkak yetişin. Artık 
bundan sonra alışılmışın dışında bir dönem başlayacak, bunu da bilin. Çünkü bu bizim ortak kaderimizdir. Siyasi kadrosuyla, 
bürokrasisiyle, gece gündüz demeden çalışmaya mecburuz. Onun için bürokrasi bugüne kadar üzerinde dolaşan o kara 
bulutları defetmek durumundadır. Bu bakımdan eğer bize ayak bağı olacak olurlarsa, kusur abakmasınlar bunun da bedelini 
ödemeyi şimdiden düşünsünler.” Full text of the speech. (2002, November 19). Retrieved July 03, 2012, from  
http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/188602.asp 
 
81 Galataport ihalesi iptal edildi. (2006, January 31). Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.cnnturk.com/2006/ekonomi/genel/01/31/galataport.ihalesi.iptal.edildi/155187.0/index.html 
 
82 “Bugün bir Haydarpaşaport yatırımı gerçeklemiş olsaydı oraya yapılacak yatırım 5 milyar dolardı... Bakıyorsunuz hemen 
dikiliveriyorlar karşınıza...Bunlar neye hizmet ediyorlar? Dünyanın hangi gelişmiş ülkesinde böyle bir zihniyet, böyle bir 
mantık görebilirsiniz? Mümkün değil.” Erdoğan: “Haydarpaşaport gerçekleşseydi 5 milyar dolarlık yatırım yapılacaktı.” 
(2008, January 26). Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
  http://www.haberler.com/erdogan-haydarpasaport-gerceklesseydi-5-milyar-haberi/ 
 
83 “Elinden tutup kaldırdığımızda İstanbul ihanete uğramıştı. Galataport'u gerçekleştirmemize bile yargı izin vermedi. Ama 
vazgeçmedik. Biraz zaman kaybettik ama hem Galataport'u hem de Haydarpaşaport'u bitireceğiz” Shopping Fest oldu 
Galataport da olacak. (2011, March 26). Sabah. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Ekonomi/2011/03/26/shopping_fest_oldu_galataport_da_olacak  
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are growing every year as Turkey deepens its ‘structural adjustment’ synchronized with the 
global economy. Mega-events of this kind have long been functioning to distract the 
international public’s attention from the severe social and political problems of the organizing 
countries as well as reiterating the hegemony of neoliberal precepts both at national and 
international levels (Yardımcı, 2005). The golden age of neoliberalism under Turgut Özal’s 
rule in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, exemplifies such situation. In this setting, one can 
talk about two opposite trends: on the one hand there was excessive state violence, and on the 
other hand a discourse of freedom which was mostly put into effect while the civil 
government was rising. This was a period marked by a boost of international cultural and 
sportive events concomitant with systematic torture and maltreatment exerted by the armed 
forces against political activists, predominantly those with leftist affiliations (Gürbilek, 
1992).  
In the same event, Erdoğan also mentioned the ‘Tophane incident’ in which art 
galleries newly emerging in the district as a part of the ongoing gentrification process were 
vandalized by the neighborhood residents for some uncertain reasons. According to the Prime 
Minister, this unpleasant scene would not have occurred if the jurisdiction had let the 
government carry on Galataport, Haydarpaşaport, and Tophane projects. This argument is 
emblematic of the AKP’s rhetoric concerning those who oppose the party’s urban practices.  
On the other hand, municipalities and the Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ) are 
given vast powers which enable them to by-pass legal and bureaucratic restrictions. Erdoğan 
Bayraktar, the former president of TOKİ and the current Minister of Environment and City 
Planning, in one of his statements explicitly declared his intention of abolishing 
‘unnecessary’ bureaucracy in the realm of construction so that private construction companies 
will be more comfortable in their investments.84 This is indeed the salient characteristics of 
the government’s urban policies: ‘make way for national and international investments’. In 
return, the contractors in the construction sector present their gratitude to Erdoğan in 
person.85 The Prime Minister makes a statement that the reason of his struggle with 
bureaucracy is attract international capital into Turkey by facilitating complicating legal and 
bureaucratic procedures.86  
                                                 
84 Bayraktar: İnşaatta bürokrasi bitecek. (2012, April 24). Türkiye Gazetesi. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.turkiyegazetesi.com/haber/532872/abone.aspx#.T-eT5Rdo3So 
 
85 Müteahhitlerden Başbakan Erdoğan’a bürokrasi teşekkürü. (2012, April 5). Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.showhaber.com/muteahhitlerden-basbakan-erdogana-burokrasi-tesekkuru-552357h.htm 
 
86 Erdoğan: Bürokrasi kabustur. (2008, April 27). Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/444285.asp 
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It is no coincidence that the slogan ‘make way for Turkey’ was initially used by the 
extremely obtrusive ‘neoliberal prince’, Cem Uzan, who participated in the 2002 general 
elections as a party leader, presumably in order to evade being sentenced for several 
embezzlements. Nevertheless, this can easily be taken as the AKP’s own because of the fact 
that the party assimilates the slogan through its steady utterance by the party cadres: ‘make 
way for entrepreneurs, businessmen, private companies.87 Not only the private sector in 
general for whom the government claims to ‘make way’ but also for other countries88, and 
even, supposedly, for the unions in Turkey89. The slogan tells us something about the 
transgressive character of neoliberalism. Rights earned in several decades of struggle within a 
certain social and political-economic structure fall victim to neoliberalism’s ‘creative 
destruction’ (Harvey, 1988). David Harvey points out that a certain way of conceptualizing 
freedom has functioned as a strong discursive weapon for neoliberalism and played an 
important part in its ‘naturalization’ at the global level (Harvey, 1988). But the question to be 
raised here is ‘freedom from what’? No doubt, it is freedom from the state’s interventionist 
policies and bureaucratic limitations.  
 Although appealing to international capital is crucial for this anti-bureaucratic 
discourse, it is hard to say that it is all about economic and practical concerns. The changing 
rhythm of life that comes with all-embracing privatizations is already recounted by Cihan 
Tuğal. In his viewpoint, professionalism becomes pervasive in people’s work habits, and in 
this way capitalism naturalizes itself at the level of daily/economic practices (Tuğal, 2009). 
The short passage from the interview with one of his interviewees is very illustrative of the 
operative discourses on the notions of privatization and bureaucracy:  
Privatization is good. The state is cumbersome. The people working for the state have 
no interest in their work. Bu here, we are all after profit. We are always struggling. We 
are always trying to do something. But the eye of the memur is always on the clock. 
He wants to go home as soon as possible. But I come here six in the morning, and I go 
back at seven. This is how one should work (Tuğal, 2009: 226).   
 
                                                 
 
87 İşimiz müteşebbisin önünü açmak. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/isimiz-mutesebbisin-onunu-acmak/19876 
Alınan verginin yüzde 84’ü hizmete gidiyor. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/alinan-verginin-yuzde-84u-hizmete-gidiyor/25291 
Konya’da dondurma fabrikasının temeli atıldı. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/konyada-dondurma-fabrikasinin-temeli-atildi/26897 
 
88 Somalili kardeşlerimizin yanında olacağız. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/somalili-kardeslerimizin-yaninda-olacagiz/26813 
 
89 Sendikaların önünü açmak için çabalıyoruz. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/sendikalarin-onunu-acmak-icin-cabaliyoruz/11569 
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 Here, there is a question of nationalism intricately related to neoliberal precepts which 
seems to be underemphasized, if not totally overlooked, in Tuğal’s work.90 The fight against 
the ‘bureaucratic oligarchy’ becomes an inherent part of ‘making way for Turkey’ so that the 
country can ‘reach the level of contemporary civilization’. Again, populism is a vital element 
in the employment of this discourse by depicting bureaucracy as the bar preventing the happy 
coalescence of the state and the ‘people’91. In one of his speeches, Erdoğan complains about 
the prohibitive mindset of the ‘bureaucratic oligarchy’ by alluding to a Turkish saying which 
can be roughly translated as: ‘The goal is not to eat the grape but beat the grape-grower’. The 
Prime Minister claims that the goal of the bureaucratic oligarchy is ‘beat the grape-grower 
whereas Erdoğan presents the major objective of himself and of his party as ‘eating the grape’ 
together with the ‘people’.92  In other words, Erdoğan’s ‘offer that cannot be refused’ is to 
make way for Turkey by freeing from the bureaucracy’s outmoded prohibitive so that the 
state and the ‘people’ together can prosper.  
This perspective offers an alternative understanding of Cihan Tuğal’s discussion of 
‘organic crisis’ and its overcoming by the institution of the AKP hegemony. Yael Navaro-
Yashin, in her book, “Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey,” outlines the 
fetishistic aspect of the Turkish State with reference to the Susurluk scandal through which 
certain dark connections – an elected parliamentarian, Istanbul’s former vice-chief of police 
and a well-known mafia dealer against whom there still had been charges, found in a car 
wreck – operative in the ‘deep state’ were ‘accidently’ revealed to the public. In Navaro-
Yashin’s account, after this disclosure, however, things seemed to be going back to normal 
due to the cynic position towards the state which was pervasive in the society. Moreover, she 
notes that those who were already critical of the Turkish state significantly sharpened their 
rhetoric toward the state and started to make use of a vocabulary of abjection in order to 
describe it: swamp, rottenness, filthiness, crookedness, degeneration, so on and so forth 
                                                 
90 It is hard to say that this results whether from the immersion of Tuğal anthropological standpoint into everday dimension 
or whether from the fact that the nationalist tone was not palpable enough for the reseacher’s eyes and ears.  
 
91 According to Ernesto Laclau, what we come across in the concept of the ‘people’ of  populism is an underprivilaged 
‘partiality’ (plebs) sees itseslf as a part of the totality of the community (populus). For him, the ‘people’ corresponds to an 
‘absent fullness’ with regard to the fact that the harmanious continuity of the social is spoiled by an experience of lack. 
Nevertheless, this experience of lack is alleviated by the populist fantasy of dichotomic depiction of the community. Laclau 
asserts that “[t]his division presupposes [...] the presence of some privilaged signifiers which condense in themselves the 
signification of a whole antagonistic camp (the ‘regime’, the ‘oligarchy’, the ‘dominant groups’, and so on, for the enemy; 
the ‘people’, the ‘nation’, the ‘silent majority’, and so on, for the oppressed underdog...”. See E. Laclau, “On Populist 
Reason,” 2009 for a thorough and interesting analysis of the notion of populism. 
92 Erdoğan'ın bürokratik oligarşi isyanı. (2009, May 10). Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://siyaset.haber.pro/cikti.php?bul=17773 
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(Navaro-Yashin, 2002)…  In Cihan Tuğal’s “Passive Revolution,” the existing organic crisis 
between the civil and political societies, which more or less coincides with Yael Navaro-
Yashin’s argument, was resolved after AKP came to office in 2002 and consolidated its power 
over the last decade. According to Tuğal, as the masses who were previously excluded and 
kept out of the discursive center started to be incorporated by the hegemony, the hegemony 
itself has undergone a remarkable transformation (Tuğal, 2009).  
A discursive landmark in this recipe is the abjection of ‘bureaucratic hegemony’ and 
its outmoded mentality.93 By clean(s)ing its abjective components, the state can now move 
forward as a purified entity with the banishment of ‘bad apples’. By the same token, the 
process of abjection is operative in the dominant discourses of urban planning. In the 
previous chapter, it was briefly mentioned that the resistance against urban transformation 
projects are denigrated and labeled as degenerate and even ‘terrorist’ initiatives with the aim 
of hampering Turkey’s progress.94 In this respect, the gentrification process, in the hegemonic 
Imaginary, works as a project of ‘clean(s)ing’ these elements from the cities’ visual regimes. 
Again, the discourse of ‘making way for Turkey’ has had a facilitative function in the 
comprehensive programs of urban projects along neoliberal values. Also, by the elimination 
of its abject, the Turkish state is ‘vindicated’ and ‘re-instituted’ as the proper proxy through 
which people can enjoy or to which they delegate their enjoyment.  
 
  
Kanal Istanbul: A Mega-Project of Enjoyment 
   
 The declaration of the ‘crazy project’ by the Prime Minister Erdoğan during the 
                                                 
93 According to Julia Kristeva, the abject is basically what the ‘I’ is not. The concept of abject is endowed wih the most 
disturbing and disgusting effects on the ‘I’. Therefore, it is banished for the sake of the pure consistency of the ‘I’. However, 
Kristeva continues, the borderlines does not remain clearly defined, and the abject continuies to disturb and haunt the ‘I’ by 
through fascination and jouissance.  According to her, it is jouissance alone that causes ‘the abject to exist as such’. One does 
not know, neither desire it, but joys in it.. I believe that the current ruling hegemony in Turkey has a curious relationship with 
its abject, embodied primarily by the former-Kemalist oligarchy (and its clandestine clic, Ergenekon) and secondarily by the 
‘non-liberal’ Left and the hard-liners in the Kurdish movement. In the indictments of the public Law, it is possible to witness 
that all these elements merge into an amorphous, conspiring organization with an edge of sublimity with respect to its 
alleged near-omnipotence and omnipresence. Even though this mentality is denounced in almost every government 
statement, one can still claim that it also functions as a source of fascination. See J. Kristeva, “Powers of Horror,” 1982 for a 
more comprehensive analysis of the concept of ‘abject’.  
 
94 Again, this relationship is not as simple as that. Because a type of abjection is here at stake, it introduces a ambivalent 
interplay between desire and disgust: “A bourgeois Imaginary saw the ‘lower’ classes as ignoring the moral codes necessary 
for respectability: this ‘moral laxity’ produced an ambivalent gaze, because moral looseness was simultaneously threatening 
and absorbing. Thus, low-Others were seen to be dirty, diseased, criminal and sexually promiscuous; on the other hand, such 
‘freedom’ from moral restriction was fascinating (both captivating and captive-making); the bourgeois observer could hardly 
keep their eyes off such behaviour. This fascination (desire and disgust) with low-Others was mapped across the topography 
of the city...” Note. From The Body and the City: Psychoanalysis, space and subjectivity by S. Pile, 1996, London Routledge, 
p. 179. Copyright 1996 by S. Pile.    
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AKP’s electoral campaigns triggered a vibrant public debate. As recounted in the 
introduction, the major focus among the supporters was on the daring characteristic of the 
project rather than its ‘doability’ or ‘feasibility’. Hence, the predominant pro- attitude was to 
endorse the project and to praise the Prime Minister Erdoğan as the mastermind of this 
extremely ambitious enterprise for his ‘thinking-big’ and unique vision. The CHP leader, 
Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu uttered his objection based on the idea (Pile, 1996) that “there is no 
human being in this project.”95 The Prime Minister Erdoğan countered this accusation by 
claiming the impossibility of satisfying Kılıçdaroğlu due to his ‘negativity bias’.96 Nihat 
Ergin, the Minister of Science, Industry, and Technology; on the other hand, responded to this 
accusation with a rather sarcastic tone: “They are saying that there is no human in it. This is a 
canal project, not a swimming pool.”97 It seems apt to depart from this sarcastic response 
which is to be taken quite seriously since Ergin unwittingly gives utterance to ideology 
prevalent in the context of the AKP hegemony.  
According to Slavoj Zizek, this kind of discussion hinging on the humanist-
ideological dichotomy of ‘human beings’ and ‘things’ would be more productive if one 
consults one of Marx’s famous inversions – that is “material relations between persons and 
social relations between things.” On this ground, Zizek contemplates on the role of fetishistic 
reversal in ideology. According to him, it is neither the Lukacsian approach that assumes an 
unalienated subjectivity (or belief) prior to reification nor the Althusserian version of 
structuralism in which fetishistic positions are determined in the set of differential relations 
that originates the fetishistic gesture. Zizek argues that it is the displacement itself of “the 
innermost relations between people […] onto relations between things” which is in fact 
“original and constitutive” (Zizek, 1997b: 41). Commodity fetishism, for Zizek, installs itself 
upon a strong ‘objective’ belief, rather than knowledge, which cannot be easily dissolved 
with plain disenchantment – realization of what commodities really are. Accordingly, the 
reason of ‘durability’ of commodities is the inherently reflective feature of belief.  
Belief is always minimally ‘reflective’, a ‘belief in the belief of the other’ – ‘I still 
believe in Communism’ equals of saying ‘I believe there are still people who believe 
in Communism’ –  while knowledge is precisely not knowledge about the fact that 
                                                 
95 “Kanal İstanbul”a Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan ilk yorum. (2011, April 27). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1126846&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
 
96 ‘Kanal Istanbul’da insan yok’. Şaşırdım, neresinde yok? Retrieved July 03, 2012, from 
http://www.kanalistanbulprojesi.web.tr/kanal-istanbulda-insan-yok-sasirdim-neresinde-yok.html 
 
97 Bakan Ergün:  Kanal İstanbul’da insan yok. Çünkü, yüzme havuzu değil. (2011, April 30). Zaman. Retrieved July 03, 
2012, from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1128354&keyfield=6B616E616C20697374616E62756C 
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there is another who knows. For this reason, I can BELIEVE through the other, but I 
cannot KNOW through the other. That is to say, due to the inherent reflectivity of 
belief, when another believes in my place, I myself believe through him; knowledge is 
not reflective in the same way: when the other is supposed to know, I do not know 
through him. (Zizek, 1997b: 43) 
  
This reflective aspect of belief is at work in the case of subject-object relations in 
commodity fetishism. This notion of belief through the Other is turned into ‘acting (or being 
active) through the Other’ with the inauguration of “interpassivity.” In Zizek’s account, one 
can talk about two sorts of interpassivity: the Other acts in my place, instead of me; and I act 
through the Other. In the first situation, the Other acts and enjoys in place of me by depriving 
me from ‘my own passive reaction of satisfaction’, whereas in the latter formulation, it is 
indeed me who acts and enjoys through the Other and I can sit back and relax while the Other 
handles my obligation to enjoy (Zizek, 1997b). So what is interpassivity in Zizek’s point of 
view?  
The object which gives body to the surplus-enjoyment fascinates the subject, it 
reduces him to a passive gaze impotently gaping at the object; this relationship, of 
course, is experienced by the subject as something shameful, unworthy. Being directly 
transfixed by the object, passively submitted to its power of fascination, is something 
ultimately unbearable: the open display of the passive attitude of ‘enjoying it’ 
somehow deprives the subject of his dignity. Interpassivity is therefore to be 
conceived as the primordial form of the subject’s defence against jouissance: I defer 
jouissance to the Other who passively endures it (laughs, suffers, enjoys…) on my 
behalf. (Zizek, 1997b: 51) 
 
Against this backdrop, the subject steps in a primordial relationship with his object 
which complicates the clear-cut subject-object separation. To Zizek, “the object is the form of 
being passive through another” (Zizek, 1997b: 51) and it primordially suffers in my place, 
which means, enjoys for me. So what overwhelms the subject in his encounter with the object 
is that the subject sees himself “in the guise of a suffering object: what reduces [him] to a 
fascinated passive observer is the scene of [himself] passively enduring it” (Zizek, 1997b: 
51). In the paradigm of interpassivity, the humanist duality, ‘human beings’ (subjects) versus 
‘things’ (objects) which is also set forth by Kılıçdaroğlu; “There is no human beings in this 
project” loses its currency. 
 Zizek takes a step further and distinguishes between the two forms of experiences 
conflating the object-subject distinction: ‘objectively subjective’ and ‘subjectively objective’. 
Zizek alludes to Kantian transcendentally constituted reality as an example of the latter, 
whereas in the former, the semblance is experienced objectively within the domain of the 
72 
 
subjective semblance itself as in the case of materialization of the ruling ideology into 
ideological apparatuses and practices (Zizek, 1997b). In Zizek’s account, “fantasy […] 
belongs to the bizarre category of the objectively subjective” (Zizek, 1997b: 53), and he 
asserts that this notion is intimately related to the mystery of fetishism.  
…what the fetish objectivizes is ‘my true belief’, the way things ‘truly seem to me’, 
although I never actually experience them in this way; apropos of commodity 
fetishism, Marx himself uses the term ‘objectively-necessary appearance’. So when a 
critical Marxist encounters a bourgeois subject immersed in commodity fetishism, the 
Marxist’s comment to him is not ‘Commodity may seem to you a magical object 
endowed with special powers, but it really is just a reified expression of relations 
between people’; the actual Marxist’s comment is, rather, ‘You may think that the 
commodity appears to you as a simple embodiment of social relations […] but this is 
not how things really seem to you – in your social exchange, you bear witness to the 
uncanny fact that a commodity really appears to you as a magical object endowed 
with special powers.’ (Zizek, 1997a: 120) 
 
Now, we can recast a look at the AKP’s crazy project, Kanal Istanbul in the light of 
Zizek’s discussion. The objection of Kılıçdaroğlu to the project is reminiscent of a comment 
by the ‘non-actual Marxist’ inasmuch as he pursues an ill-fated political strategy to 
disenchant people from the ‘objective fantasy of commodity fetishism’ (Eagleton, 1991: 40). 
In terms of ‘what in reality takes place’ in the whole case of the crazy project, it seems 
plausible to assert that Kanal Istanbul is a decision taken by a handful of individuals and it 
strives to distribute public resources in advantage of a dozen businessmen through land and 
real-estate speculation. However, formulating the whole chain of events and intentions at the 
level of actual individuals would be ‘incorrect’ insofar as a symbolic order functions 
effectively only as virtual. Still, this does not negate the fact that the virtual feature of the 
Symbolic is highly effective in determining the ‘the fate of things’ (Zizek, 1997a: 100). As 
said earlier, the symbolic order with all its lacks and limitations sustains itself with its 
fantasmatic support. If we take into account the fact that fantasy may be defined as an 
objectively subjective category, the symbolic order becomes irreducible to a set of subjective 
relations. Therefore, Kılıçdaroğlu’s position in this debate is not only indefensible on the 
plane of ethics (‘I’ know ‘how things truly are’ and I open your eyes to the truth of the project 
that ‘there is no human in it’) but also in terms of its currency within this political-aesthetic 
paradigm. It simply did not work.   
Enjoyment is an important aspect to be stressed in relation to the phenomenon of 
Kanal Istanbul due to the relentless outburst of the obscene display of power on the psychical 
world. Herein, space is ‘feminized’ by being construed as a passive object in a male fantasy. 
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The hegemonic order marks space with its phallic images like skyscrapers which are 
promoted as symbols of national development in the neoliberal visual regime. This may also 
be taken as the expression of the spatial arrogance and masculine brutality of the AKP 
hegemony and its spatial regulations. If we are to talk about the transgresive practices on 
space through cold abstraction, Kanal Istanbul is the paragon of this mentality. Moreover, 
one can also talk about a certain kind of masculine enjoyment regime emanating from playing 
with the landscape as easily as with a pie, which is supported by the fantasy of an atavistic 
historical continuity – Mehmet II who moves the ships from the land, the Grand Vizier 
Sokullu Mehmet who plans to open a canal in Suez with his ‘transcendent’ vision, etc…This 
continuity may be interpreted with reference to the figure of the obscene father in Sigmund 
Freud’s Totem and Taboo, who possesses a mythical ‘uncastrated’ enjoyment.  
The father of the ‘primal horde’ in Totem and Taboo is the ‘father of jouissance’, an 
exception to the Law with which the father in the oedipal triangle is bound. “The father of the 
primal horde is the père sévère, who is egoistical and jealous, the sexual glutton who also 
keeps his sons in check by the threat of castration” (Grigg, 2008: 30). Lacan clarifies the 
ambiguous roles of the father as Freud defines it in the Oedipus complex and in Totem and 
Taboo by positing the imaginary-symbolic-real distinction. In Lacan’s formulation, the real 
father, the father of the primal horde who enjoys all of the women is a retrospective product 
of a ‘fundamental fantasy’ which implies an impossibility – that is the impossibility of 
enjoying all women.  The real/mythical father, in Lacan’s account, has both the function of 
enjoyer and the prohibitor of enjoyment. It is also interesting to observe the development 
from the Oedipal father whose function is to pacify and regulate the ‘obscure power of the 
feminine sex’ embodied in the omnipotence of the figure of the mother to the mythical father 
figure in Totem and Taboo who seems to assume this obscure omnipotence (Grigg, 2008). 
The whole issue of Kanal Istanbul is relevant to this discussion. What Prime Minister 
Erdoğan does by mentioning the ‘mythical’ figures – who were indeed actual human beings 
but whose representations are deeply mythical – in his presentation of the project is to claim 
to resurrect and embody the ‘uncastrated enjoyment’ which was allegedly possessed by the 
ancestors. This is, in other words, the negation of castration. Like those figures who enjoyed 
all the physical geography without suffering any limitations, the contemporary political 
power presents itself as a resurrection and embodiment of this impossible enjoyment.  
In one of her works, Nurdan Gürbilek, a Turkish literary critique, contemplates on an 
important author, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, whose works are often consulted in order to have 
an understanding of the right-wing political aesthetics in Turkey. Gürbilek argues that 
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Tanpınar’s writings are products of longing for a lost past. But this past is described as 
‘glorious’ and national in Tanpınar’s works. From Gürbilek’s viewpont, Tanpınar’s stories 
become meaningful insofar as they find a place in the ‘glorious’ national continuity whereas 
elements remaining outside this harmonious continuity are regarded unpleasant and undesired 
residues. In Gürbilek’s exegesis, what Tanpınar strives to do is to re-deem a past 
characterized by properties such as harmony, oneness, completeness and wholeness 
(Gürbilek, 2011). This kind of attitude may also be witnessed in the Prime Minister’s 
articulation of the glorious past and self-presentation as the latest link of this historical 
continuity. Yet, at this juncture, we must pay attention to the fact that this sort of oceanic 
relationship with the (m)other – or the father inasmuch as the two converges in terms of their 
function when the ‘obscene’ father in Totem and Taboo – in which uncastrated jouissance is 
believed to exist is the ruse of jouissance itself. It is jouissance alone which retroactively 
constructs the primordial state of wholeness/completeness (Stavrakakis, 1999).  
  By taking these into consideration, we should now focus on the kind of enjoyment 
(jouissance) that is at stake here. In general, one can distinguish between two sorts of 
jouissance in terms of their different relation to the Other. The phallic jouissance is instituted 
upon the failure of the phallus which cannot fulfill the subject even after its acquisition of the 
object cause of desire. This jouissance, also known as ‘symbolic jouissance’, is fallible. The 
Other jouissance, on the other hand, is infallible but more elusive than the former. In this 
situation, the subject can be duped by jouissance insofar as what the subject reckons as its 
own jouissance can be the one extracted (stolen) by the Other. Then again, interpassivity 
comes into the picture, when this jouissance can also be our enjoyment as the Other, or our 
enjoyment through the Other (Fink, 1997). In Zizek’s interpretation of Lacan, the enjoyment 
comes to be the enjoyment of the Other through imputation. In this formulation, the ‘theft of 
enjoyment’ gains a different meaning as in the fantasies projected to various ‘others’ (Zizek, 
1993) 
Apart from distinct types of jouissance, one’s relationship with the enjoyment of the 
Other occurs in more than one way. According to Lacan, this is feminine version of 
jouissance. Since the Other jouissance is ineffable, it can be experienced by women without 
knowing anything about it (Stavrakakis, 1999). A comparison of the hysteric and the pervert 
illustrates two opposite ways of dealing with the Other’s enjoyment.  
Hysteria provides the exemplary case of desire as a defence against jouissance: in 
contrast to the pervert who works incessantly to provide enjoyment to the Other, the 
neurotic-hysteric wants to be the object of the Other’s desire, not the object of his 
enjoyment – she is well aware that the only way to remain desired is to postpone the 
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satisfaction, the gratification of desire which would bring enjoyment. The hysteric’s 
fear is that, in so far as she is the object of the Other’s enjoyment, she is reduced to an 
instrument of the Other, exploited manipulated by him; on the other hand, there is 
nothing a true pervert enjoys more than being an instrument of the Other, of his 
jouissance (Zizek, 1997a: 33).   
 
We come across a predicament here. Although it may seem to be a resistance against 
the overbearing effect of the Other in the subject’s experience of enjoyment, the hysteric 
discourse does not offer a way out of our unproductive relation with the Other jouissance. 
Since, the hysteric is obsessed with the sacrifice jouissance that enables her to enter the 
Symbolic, she incessantly tries to retrieve this enjoyment ‘illegitimately’ taken from her by 
the Other. In other words, the hysteric does not recognize the legitimacy of the Other. But the 
problem arises at the point in which the ultimate goal of the hysteric becomes the prevention 
of the Other to profit from her own enjoyment even if this means sacrificing everything 
(Zizek, 1997a). 
The pervert discourse where one enjoys by turning himself into the instrument of the 
Other appears to correspond to the enjoyment regime in the case of Kanal Istanbul and 
generally in contemporary Turkey. Can we not articulate the impassioned spectators that 
attended the event of the Kanal Istanbul presentation as perverts in their feverish attempt to 
supplement the representation strived by the Other? In line with this, the glowing cheers and 
ovation of the spectators in the conference hall do nothing but cherishes the Other’s 
enjoyment by validating its fantasy: “Look at them enjoying!”98 If we go back to 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s objection – ‘there is no human being in this project’ – the question can be re-
articulated as follows: what is the role of human beings in this project? It is true that no figure 
of human being appeared in the digital animation of Kanal Istanbul. But what kind of 
envisagement is in effect for the human beings in the ‘cold abstraction’ of the crazy project? 
By being there, do they not become a part of the ‘sublime’ totality of the nation by witnessing 
a ‘historical movement’ since the great accomplishments of the ancestors? Can human beings 
be more than mere decorations within this phallic geography aspired by the Other? These 
questions provide a more fertile ground for us to discuss the AKP’s spatial policies and 
                                                 
98 “...‘Look at them enjoying!’ recalls the gaze, which previously was the preeminent agency for making one 
ashamed. For the period in which Lacan is speaking, if it is necessary to recall the gaze, it is because the Other 
who could be looking has disappeared. The look that one solicits today by turning reality into a spectacle—and 
all television is a reality show—is a gaze castrated of its power to shame, which it is constantly demonstrating. 
As if the mission, or at least the unconscious consequence, of this capture of the television spectacle was to 
demonstrate that shame is dead.” Note. From “On Shame,” in Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of 
Psychoanalysis, J. Clemens, & R. Grigg (eds.), by Jacques Alain Miller, 2006, London: Duke University Press, 
p.15.  
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aesthetics in relation to the enjoyment regime employed by the party.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
  
In the last three decaded, Turkey has gone through a drastic spatial transformation, most of 
which has taken place in urban areas. This change has accelerated in the last couple of years 
as neoliberal urbanism re-gained momentum after its initial installation in the 1980s. One 
comes across numerous ads of new residences and luxurious mass housings in mass media. 
Skyscrapers and trade centers continue to pop up in the urban business centers. Those 
constructions do not only address a limited number of crème de la crème but also the new 
middle class which has remarkably grown in the last decade. The displacement of the urban 
poor and the working class dwelling in the central districts of cities is another dimension that 
is often obscured or underemphasized. The political power, on the other hand, has heavily 
invested in those spatial practices in order establish and maintain its hegemonic position. 
Overall, there is a whole politics revolving around the issues of space and architecture.    
This thesis aimed at investigating the AKP’s affective politics through an examination 
of the party’s spatial practices and discourses. From the time that the party obtained the 
majority in the parliament after 2002 general elections, an unprecedented discourse 
concerning space and architecture came to be in force. Because the party embraced neoliberal 
principles in city planning, notions of effectiveness, feasibility, and professionalism have 
come to be decisive factors in the AKP’s spatial politics, at least in its early period. 
Nevertheless, especially in the last three years, the party’s stance has been remarkably altered. 
The factors which were prevalent during the party’s first years in the office became of 
secondary importance as aesthetics of grandeur and national pride started to manifest 
themselves in the government’s recent actions and rhetoric which to a large extent reminded 
the Kemalist-nationalist spatial practices. However, studying neoliberalism and the 
modernist-nationalist discourse in terms of their effect on the party’s politics are not sufficient 
to understand the success of the AKP hegemony despite the fact that these two attitudes may 
very well be taken as the two cornerstones of the party’s spatial politics.   
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 At this point, Kanal Istanbul which is more commonly known as the ‘crazy project’ is 
preferred to be the departure point of this study since the project exemplifies the discursive 
and aesthetic features as well as the inherent contradictions present within the AKP 
hegemony. The whole process of the presentation of Kanal Istanbul can be considered to be a 
marketing success on the part of the political authority and a state of delirium on the part of 
the public. During the first months of the campaigns of 2011 general elections, an aura of 
suspense was created around the project whose content was going to be announced by the the 
Prime Minister himself. Names who can be defined as the ‘spin-doctors’ of the incumbent 
government, instigated the anxiety by guessing the content of the project before its official 
declaration with the aim of ‘showing off’ their prestige and vast information networks 
emanated from the capacity to be the ‘inside-man’ in the decision-making circles. The 
presentation, on the other hand, was a political spectacle par excellence. The huge conference 
hall, the digital animation of the project, the performance of the Prime Minister Erdoğan, the 
cheering crowd were formative of the spectacular atmosphere in the event. In the aftermath of 
the presentation, the frantic state continued especially in the business sector. Entrepreneurs 
with close links to the government conspicuously excessively invested, both financially and 
rhetorically, on this project which lacked the preliminary surveys concerning the issues such 
as financial resources, feasibility study, or site investigation.  
However, it was not only the supporters who contributed to the popularity of the topic, 
but also those who opposed Kanal Istanbul had a considerable role in the project’s 
‘topicality’. A part of the opposition dismissed the project completely while some put in a 
claim for Kanal Istanbul originally as their idea. Various opinion leaders did not hold a 
defiant stand against the AKP and its project but tried to convince the government to pursue a 
more ‘down-to earth’ agenda such as solving the Kurdish issue or the topic of EU accession. 
Nevertheless, the most intriguing comments came from those who announced their support to 
the project regardless of the project’s possible advantages in the case of its realization. 
According to this approach, the project was a sign of the Prime Minister Erdoğan’s political 
genius and his capability to appeal the masses by incorporating them with his own ‘dreams’. 
One of the basic assumptions of this study was that this sort of interpretation points to a new 
political paradigm in which promise in its classical sense loses its currency, and a new 
relationship between the political elite and the voters is introduced. In the old formula, the 
promise employs a desire mechanism with the postponement of satisfaction until its 
realization whereas the in the paradigm of ‘end of promise’ – token by Jacques Ranciere – it 
is now the promise itself that is enjoyed by the masses regardless of its ‘doability’ or 
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‘practicalness’.    
  The major concern of this study was to investigate the ways in which the AKP 
constitutes and maintains its hegemony through spatial practices and regulations of everyday 
life. To be more precise, discourses concerning more specific topics such as architecture and 
construction, as well as space in general, were put under scrutiny in this thesis. Accordingly, 
the discussion was carried out mostly on the virtual plane rather than referring to the ‘tactile’ 
aspect of space. Neoliberalism was treated as one of the pillars of the party’s hegemonic 
position. In this line of thinking, it would not be wrong to argue that the ‘crazy project’ bears 
several characteristics of neoliberalism which points to a certain social, political, and cultural 
matrix as well as a set of economic precepts. In the neoliberal setting, the politics is 
‘hollowed out’. More accurately, political realm is deprived of politics while politics is turned 
into a spectacle, an ‘aesthetized’ experience which ignores class conflicts and antagonisms by 
de-contextualizing politics from social ‘reality’ – or the reality of social relations. The 
neoliberalization of the city with urban transformation projects goes hand in hand with the 
neoliberalization of political arena with the trivialization of politics. Yet, we also see that the 
dominant features of the former hegemony do not easily go away as the AKP’s rhetoric has 
become more and more in tune with the Kemalist/nationalist discourse in the recent years. 
Kanal Istanbul is a perfect example of such tendency since important tenets of neoliberalism, 
such as effectiveness and feasibility, seem to be replaced by a crude display of national power 
and aesthetics of grandeur. Still, looking merely at these two components prevalent in the 
party’s discourse falls short of explaining how the AKP produces and reproduces its 
hegemony. Something, that is quite crucial for the well-functioning of the hegemony, eludes 
this analysis as well as all kinds of analyses. Therefore, this thesis ventured on an arduous 
wager of giving account of ‘bits of the real’ of the AKP hegemony by employing the concept 
of enjoyment (jouissance).     
 Herein, Lacanian psychoanalysis became one of the basic guidance of this research 
for several reasons. Because the social psyche has lately been in an excessive state, as we see 
most clearly in the case of Kanal Istanbul, psychoanalysis appeared as the suitable approach 
to understand the dynamics of this situation. Moreover, the Lacanian conceptualization offers 
a productive ground to understand the process of subject-formation with respect to virtuality 
and spatiality. According to the Lacanian framework, subject is formed through the 
mechanisms of identification and (mis-)recognition which confuse the boundaries set by the 
‘humanist’ mindset. At this juncture, the concept of ‘interpassivity’, which can roughly be 
described as subjects’ way of dealing with enjoyment, gains a critical importance because 
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clearly defined boundaries between the one and the other, between subject and object start to 
be blurred when jouissance comes into the picture. Apart from that, Lacan and several 
Lacanian intellectuals write abundantly on late capitalism which is extremely pertinent to our 
case. Taking into account the transgressive character of late capitalism, as argued by Slavoj 
Zizek, Yannis Stavrakakis, and several others, was quite helpful in grasping the AKP’s spatial 
politics-discourse.  
 Cihan Tuğal’s “Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism,” 
was another basic source that drew the framework of this study. Since Tuğal gives a detailed 
account of how the AKP constitutes its hegemony through spatial regulations and daily life 
practices in his book, this thesis extensively consulted to this work. In Tuğal’s perspective, 
the AKP experience is very much related to the process of neoliberalization and the spread of 
capitalist relations into the general population. By conducting an ethnographic study in one of 
the bastions of political-Islamic movement, Sultanbeyli, Tuğal clearly illustrates the ways in 
which contentious tendencies are absorbed by the hegemonic position while this absorption 
brings about a change to the content and structure of the hegemony. Nevertheless, this thesis 
also strived to deal with an aspect underemphasized – not completely overlooked – in Tuğal’s 
book. This is the affective aspect, the unsymbolizable and ineffable dimension – which was 
translated into the terms of Lacanian psychoanalysis, as the ‘Real’ and jouissance.     
 In the first chapter of this research, neoliberalism was put under investigation with the 
intention of grasping its part in the AKP hegemony. A brief historical account of the 
institutionalization of neoliberalism was given so as to have a better understanding of the 
background against which certain spatial political practices and urban policies became 
operative. The story of Istanbul with reference to its ‘promotion’ to the status of global city 
was accompanied by the structural transformation of political, social, cultural and economic 
realms at the national level. Also, the emergence and the dissolution of the ‘organic crisis’ – a 
Gramcian term employed by Tuğal – constituted a subtext throughout the chapter which 
overlapped the neoliberalization process in the last three decades of Turkey. In the first part of 
the chapter, the early stage of neoliberalism in the 1980s was stressed. This era witnessed the 
implementation of neoliberal policies by the Motherland Party (ANAP) under the leadership 
of Turgut Özal on the national scope while Bedrettin Dalan – the then major of Istanbul and a 
member of ANAP – carried them out in the context of Istanbul. During Dalan’s term in the 
office, municipalities were equipped with vast powers to execute radical urban 
transformations which re-arranged the class relations within the city. As Istanbul was 
organized in accordance with the requirements of capital, the city started to be conceived of 
80 
 
as a commodity and a ‘show case’ to pleasure those who can afford.  
 The second part of the chapter, the 1990s was under focus. In the first years of the 
1990s, ANAP started to lose power and after the unexpected death of Özal, the one-party 
government was replaced by a coalition government. Successive government was also going 
to be formed by coalition for the next ten years, up until the AKP’s electoral triumph in 2002. 
In its broad contours, the 1990s was a period imbued with economic crisis, political 
instability and uncertainty. On the one hand, the macroeconomic numbers were going worse 
each day together with the painful decrease in people’s purchasing power. On the other hand, 
the political elite was paying the most attention to the threats that it defined, namely the 
Kurdish movement and the political-Islam. This situation caused an organic crisis in which a 
mutual distrust between the state and the civil society reigns. The rise of the political-Islam 
and its representative party, the Welfare Party (RP) in that era might be construed as a 
reaction against this course of events. Istanbul was at the center of the RP’s attention 
inasmuch as the city was regarded the seat of the Ottoman heritage and its symbolic power. 
After coming to the office, the party embraced a belligerent rhetoric by mentioning the 
second conquest by cleansing the degenerate elements from the old imperial capital, Istanbul. 
Although the Welfare Party, to a large extent, was able to implement a radical populism 
favoring disadvantageous group in the expense of the welfare of upper classes, it was still 
bound with the prevailing economic rules. Furthermore, the defiant attitude of the party was 
used as an excuse to a ‘post-modern’ military intervention which ousted the coalition 
government formed by the Islamists and the center-right party, DYP.    
 The last part of this chapter focused on the AKP’s coming to power and constitution 
of its hegemony in the neoliberal context. After the removal of the RP, another coalition 
government was formed, and ruled the country until the economic crisis in 2001. In the 
general elections held after the crisis, the AKP was able to form the new government without 
any partners by collecting more than the thirty percent of the votes. According to several 
scholars, the key factor to the party’s success was to form a pro-EU, pro-Western, inter-class 
coalition. Most roughly, the AKP constituted close links with the business circles by virtue of 
its pro-market stance while the party also invested on the everyday life through spatial 
regulations in order to retain its hegemonic hold on the masses’ consent. The belligerent tone 
that was inherited by the RP was dropped by the AKP as the discourse of ‘service’ [icraat] 
became central in the party’s rhetoric. This discursive shift also enabled the AKP to present 
itself a ‘non-ideological’ party whose only motive is allegedly ‘to serve the people’. While 
TOKİ and private construction companies with close links to the government started to 
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colonize various regions of the city, this was rendered as a part of the service people without 
considering the winners and losers of this process. In this setting, it is possible to talk about 
‘the hollowing out of politics’ regarding the AKP’s political discourse where politics itself is 
suspended. The fantasy of Saudi Arabia is a perfect expression of this attitude as an imagined 
land bare of political conflicts and social antagonisms. In addition to that, a new type of 
populism, namely the neoliberal populism, was put in action by the party. According to this 
version of populism, fiscal discipline and macroeconomic balance has primary importance, 
and because of that political promise in the conventional sense, which has a crucial role in the 
Keynesian eras throughout the 1960s and 1970s, loses its currency. One of the AKP’s major 
achievements was to implement this kind of populism while at the same time retaining its 
popular support.   
This brings us to the next chapter inasmuch as neoliberalism does not suffice to 
explain the whole AKP experience. Here, aside from the AKP’s neoliberal feature, the early 
republican legacy and its effect on the party’s discourse were scrutinized. This chapter is 
constructed by two parts. At the outset, the Kemalist hegemony, especially prevalent in the 
first decades of the republic, was analyzed with respect to its spatial practices, regulations and 
rhetoric. In a nutshell, this period was marked by a set of pedagogical spatial practices 
exerted by the political elite in order to create modern Turkish citizens. A major aspiration of 
the early republican ruling class was to craft a modern country along with universal values. 
Add to that, the country was in dire straits since it newly came out of the war. Modern 
Movement appeared to be the perfect option for the Kemalist project due to this architectural 
movement’s emphasis on functionality and economism. In this context, architects came to be 
salient figures allegedly endowed with artistic skills and technical knowledge at the same 
time. They were often regarded as the pedagogical figures that were capable of framing the 
normative life for the ‘new men’. Nevertheless, the early republican architectural aesthetic 
was not solely about dull pedagogy but it also comprised some exceptional examples that 
bear character and democratic potentiality.  
 When we come to the AKP case, it is possible to see vestiges of continuity as well as 
of rupture and discontinuity. As the AKP started to show more and more developmentalist 
and nationalist tendencies in its spatial practices, the party’s rhetoric started to resonate with 
that of the early republican hegemonic discourse. The cases of the ‘crazy island’ and the 
decoration of trade centers with Turkish flags may be counted as the two examples of 
continuity with the early republican project of displaying the national identity in public 
spaces. But it is also important to take into account that the AKP came to power in the context 
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of late capitalism. In that respect, both the political economy and the hegemonic discourse 
regarding the notions of architecture and construction demonstrate significant differences 
from those of the early republican era. At this point, we come across with the figure of 
contractor [müteahhit] most perfectly epitomized by Ali Ağaoğlu in the context of 
contemporary Turkey. In contrast to the pedagogical figure of the architect, Ali Ağaoğlu can 
be said to occupy an exceptional position and performs an obscenely ‘enjoying character’ due 
to his expensive car collection and supermodel girlfriends. Yet, on the other hand, this lofty 
life-style does not prevent Ağaoğlu to present himself a ‘man of the people’ by putting on a 
populist rhetoric. Overall, Ağaoğlu appears to be an emblematic figure not only of the 
contractors, but also of the hegemonic discourse in Turkey with respect to his various 
similarities with the Prime Minister Erdoğan. 
 The last chapter of this thesis was dedicated to the role of enjoyment – that which 
exceeds the symbolic order – in the hegemony of the AKP. In the first two parts of the 
chapter, Lacanian psychoanalysis’ conceptualizations of subjectivity, space, transgression and 
enjoyment were stressed. In addition to that, the rhetoric of ‘make way for Turkey’ was dealt 
with in relation to its all-pervasiveness during the reign of the AKP. Regarding this case, the 
enjoyment derived from the fantasy of ‘progressing’ through the transgression of the 
bureaucratic and legal restrictions and limitations was contemplated. The gesture of abjection 
appeared as another dynamic generating enjoyment. Here, the political power vindicates itself 
by ‘defecating’ the unwanted elements from its body, and employs a certain kind of 
enjoyment emanated from the act of defecation.  
The final part of the chapter focused on the role of ‘interpassivity’ in seeing the whole 
case of Kanal Istanbul under a new light. By consulting the works of Slavoj Zizek, 
interpassivity, as a way of dealing with the traumatic effect of enjoyment, was conceptualized 
as a register that blurs the boundaries between the subject and the object. Moreover, the 
notion of fetishism was elaborated in relation to the case of interpassivity throughout our 
discussion. At this juncture, the statement of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main 
opposition party, that ‘there was no human’ in Kanal Istanbul, was put under consideration. 
Since the ‘humanist’ formulation ‘human beings’ verses ‘things’ loses its validity in the 
paradigm of fetish, Kılıçdaroğlu’s argument seems to miss the point. Hence, questions such 
as ‘who enjoys what’ or ‘what sort of enjoyment’ were raised. The Prime Minister’s persistent 
reference to the historical continuity from the Ottoman rulers to the present day, and the type 
of examples with regard to mankind’s relation with geography imply a certain kind of 
enjoyment which negates castration. The contemporary political power claims to possess 
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such ‘full’ enjoyment by displaying its power in two ways: by playing with the psychical 
environment not out of necessity, but pleasure; and by offering a harmonious wholeness and 
oneness with the glorious past. Subjects’ interaction with this allegedly ‘full’ enjoyment, on 
the other hand, has a perverse character. Because subject-positions in this matrix can be 
possible only insofar as they find ‘meaningful’ locuses in the metaphysical ‘wholeness’ and 
‘oneness’, a perverse relationship with the Other’s enjoyment takes stage as subjects enjoy by 
becoming the tool of the Other, the decoration in the Other’s fantasy.     
At this point, it would be suitable to make some clarifications. First of all, the fetish 
for the state is to be added in the equation in order to make sense of the issue of crazy project 
which is not merely about neoliberalism but also very much linked to the unconscious 
attachments to national identity and to the state as the rightful proxy of national enjoyment. 
However, one should also consider that the notion of state is never as obscene as that of today 
in Turkey. Notwithstanding its former attitude towards its inherent limit and deficiency, the 
state does not conceal its lack and inconsistency from the eyes of the public. On the contrary, 
contemporary political discourse in Turkey traverses its inner limit by enjoying it overtly and 
obscenely. Although we are here talking about a conservative political movement, the fact 
that it embraces neoliberal values immerses it into the aesthetic level of late capitalism. As 
mentioned earlier, in the era of late capitalism, the command to ‘enjoy’ becomes a mandate 
coming from the Other. Moreover, the phenomenon of Kanal Istanbul as an expression of 
commodity fetishism ought to be ruminated in conjunction with the fetish for the state. It is 
deeply related to the idea of the ‘I’ as a part of Turkey which is now prospering and finally 
catching up with the West. Or to put in yet another, and perhaps a more accurate way, the 
whole issue is about me clinging to and trying to get a piece from the Other’s phallic 
enjoyment that is put in circulation by the political hegemony. In this setting, Istanbul, as the 
old Imperial capital, becomes a site of collective imaginary, or better a locus of social fantasy, 
upon which the Other commands people’s enjoyment to be invested.    
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